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This article covers cases from Volumes 528 through 559 of the
Southwestern Reporter (Third Edition) that the authors believe are
noteworthy to the jurisprudence on real property law.
I. INTRODUCTION
During this Survey period, there were several forcible detainer cases
challenging jurisdictional standing of the justice court, supersedeas bond
procedures and tenancy-in-sufferance language. Also, there were typical
interpretation of contractual language cases, some appropriate and some
questionable, with several pending before the Texas Supreme Court for
resolution. Most courts continued to follow the Texas Supreme Court’s
lead in imposing a strict four corners approach to interpreting deeds and
documents. The courts also imposed a strict compliance approach to cor-
rection instruments.
There was also a steady stream of sufficiency of summary judgment
affidavits and several will be discussed for this Survey period. The stan-
dards and methods of determining fair market value in anti-deficiency
suits were analyzed by one court, and in what may come as a surprise to
many practitioners, the Texas Supreme Court reversed a lower court’s
holding on the appropriate standard for damages for slander of title. An
expansion of the Moayedi doctrine for statute of limitations waiver was
also considered.
There were a few cases of first impression: (1) using the res judicata
doctrine “as a weapon”; (2) using premises liability for an “off-premises”
cause of injury; (3) finding no covenant of seisin in the presence of a
complete failure of title conveyed by a special warranty deed; (4) finding
that a residential use restrictive covenant was not violated by repeated
temporary rentals; and (5) interpreting what behavior of a landlord con-
stitutes “bad faith” when it comes to the issue of withholding the refund
of a security deposit.
II. MORTGAGES, LIENS AND FORECLOSURES
A. CONSTRUCTION OF CONFLICTING DOCUMENTS—FORGERY
Edwards v. Fannie Mae1 involved a contested foreclosure sale based
upon the interpretation of a note and deed of trust with conflicting infor-
mation. Edwards brought suit against the Federal National Mortgage As-
sociation (Fannie Mae) on property inherited from his mother. The crux
of the suit was that the foreclosure was not conducted on the appropriate
1. 545 S.W.3d 169 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2017, pet. denied).
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note and deed of trust, because the petition attached a note and deed of
trust which referenced or contained different dates of execution (March
6, 2007 and March 15, 2007) and principal amount ($156,500 and
$158,400) of such documents.2 Fannie Mae’s summary judgment position
was supported by an affidavit of its foreclosure specialist, which identified
a note and deed of trust and also referred to the loan as a Texas home
equity note.3 The deed of trust attached to the motion for summary judg-
ment contained a provision that it was not a Texas home equity loan.4
The El Paso Court of Appeals characterized these discrepancies as “the
inaccuracies in mass produced loan documents and foreclosure
paperwork.”5 On the issue of whether the discrepancies created a genu-
ine issue of material fact as to the existence of an alleged second promis-
sory note, the court determined that no such discrepancy existed since the
documents contained “enough other connections that . . . they unques-
tionably reference each other:”6 (1) the maker and borrower were the
same in both; (2) the final installment payment dates were the same in
both; (3) the documents were executed at the same time; and (4) the
property was the same in both documents.7 As to whether the transaction
was a Texas home equity loan, the court determined that such inconsis-
tent statement did not lead to any confusion over the note in default,
which was the note referenced by the deed of trust.8 Edwards, on his
claim of forgery, did not present credible evidence, having only provided
an inadmissible conclusory affidavit stating he knew his mother’s signa-
ture and that it was not her signature on the deed of trust.9 The court
required that there must be a factual basis as to how the affiant is familiar
with his mother’s signature (such as possession of handwritten letters,
bills, and other writings), how the witness obtained such personal knowl-
edge, and an explanation of the unique qualities of the signature that
were missing or different which raised the issue of forgery.10 While this
conclusion might seem stretched to reach a particular result, it neverthe-
less reinforces the practitioner’s obligations in affidavit preparation.
B. FORECLOSURE—RES JUDICATA DEFENSE
McKeehan v. Wilmington Savings Fund Society, FSB11 involved a fore-
closure of a home equity loan, but the First Houston Court of Appeals
decided on two points not directly related to foreclosure. McKeehan
signed a home equity mortgage but was unable to make his scheduled
payments and entered into a forbearance agreement. The forbearance
2. Id. at 172.
3. Id. at 173.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 172.
6. Id. at 175.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 180.
9. Id. at 179.
10. Id.
11. 554 S.W.3d 692 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2018, no pet.).
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plan substituted reduced monthly payments for the period from July 2011
to December 2011, with a balloon payment and resumption of regular
scheduled payments in January 2012.12 A dispute occurred which resulted
in McKeehan failing to make the January and February 2012 payments
and Wilmington initiated foreclosure. When Wilmington’s third Rule 736
Application for Nonjudicial Foreclosure was denied, it filed for judicial
foreclosure against McKeehan.13 The trial court entered judgment in
favor of Wilmington and McKeehan appealed on numerous grounds. Wil-
mington raised as an affirmative defense the doctrine of res judicata. In a
prior proceeding of this matter (2013 suit), McKeehan alleged Wilming-
ton’s lien on the home was unconstitutional; however, instead of chal-
lenging the constitutionality of the lien, Wilmington defended on the
basis of the statute of limitations. A federal court concluded the suit was
time barred and dismissed the case.14 So, in the current proceeding, Wil-
mington took the position that McKeehan should have defended based
on a claim of no default under the forbearance agreement, but did not do
so; therefore, the current suit should be dismissed based on the res judi-
cata doctrine.
The affirmative defense of res judicata15 is typically used in defense of
an action brought against the party asserting such doctrine. But Wilming-
ton asserted this doctrine to block McKeehan’s defensive claim of per-
formance.16 The court of appeals found that Wilmington’s defense in the
prior case did not require it to assert its right for foreclosure as a compul-
sory counterclaim in the 2013 suit and, therefore, the 2013 suit should not
prevent McKeehan’s defense in the current foreclosure action.17 As a
matter of first impression, the court determined that Wilmington could
use the res judicata defense “as a weapon to prevent . . . [the assertion of
the] defense of payment.”18
C. FORECLOSURE—SERVICER’S STANDING
Hinton v. Nationstar Mortgage LLC19 involved a foreclosure sale chal-
lenge based on a servicer’s lack of standing to foreclosure and a Texas
constitutional challenge based on an inaccurate closing estimate of ad
valorem tax payments. Hinton defaulted on his homestead loan six
months after the closing. On January 16, 2010, a notice of default and
intent to accelerate letter was sent; acceleration occurred on May 2, 2010,
12. Id. at 695.
13. Id. at 696.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 700–01 (citing Travelers Ins. Co. v. Joachim, 315 S.W.3d 860, 862 (Tex.
2010)). The court of appeals noted the elements of an affirmative defense of res judicata
included proof of “(1) a prior final determination on the merits by a court of competent
jurisdiction; (2) identity of parties are those in privity; and (3) a second action based on the
same claims as were or could have been raised in the first action” Id.
16. Id. at 701.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. 533 S.W.3d 44 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2017, no pet.).
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and foreclosure was sought in June 2010. On September 17, 2013, the
note and deed of trust were assigned to Nationstar, which rescinded the
March 27, 2014 acceleration of the debt, but subsequently accelerated the
debt and intervened in the existing foreclosure suit on May 1, 2014. As is
typical in many lien assignment transactions, Nationstar did not file its
assignment document until July 1, 2014, after the intervention in the suit.
Hinton argued that Nationstar did not have standing to intervene in the
foreclosure suit because such assignment was filed after its intervention,
so the legal right was vested in another party (i.e., the assignor).20 The
security instrument defined “lender” as “any holder of the Note who is
entitled to receive payments under the Note.”21 Based on testimony from
Nationstar’s employees at trial, the court concluded that the delivery of
the collateral file containing the original note gave Nationstar the status
as the holder of the note with the standing and authority to enforce the
note.22
Hinton also challenged the deed of trust validity under the Texas con-
stitution requirement that the homestead owner must receive a “final
itemized disclosure of the actual fees, points, interest, costs, and charges
that will be charged at closing.”23 There was a misrepresentation of the
estimated monthly tax payments because the homestead had two sepa-
rate lots and the estimate was based on only one of the two lots. So, the
issue was whether the estimated property taxes breached the constitu-
tional requirement of disclosure of items “charged at closing.”24 Relying
primarily on Black’s Law Dictionary, the San Antonio Court of Appeals
concluded that charging means to “demand a fee” or “to bill”25 and that
“property taxes were not charged at closing but were assessed by the
property taxing authority at a subsequent time with bills due and payable
on January 31 of the subsequent year.”26 The court also found that the
definition of “closing” in the context of a real estate home transaction,
involved the final meeting of the parties at which documents are signed
and delivered.27 Therefore, such constitutional provision did not prohibit
a foreclosure of a homestead when the owner received an inaccurate esti-
mate of ad valorem tax payments made at the time of the closing of the
real estate transaction.
D. FORCIBLE DETAINER AFTER FORECLOSURE
1. Due Process Challenge
Reynoso v. Dibs US, Inc.28 discussed a forcible detainer action after a
20. Id. at 49.
21. Id. at 48.
22. Id. at 49.
23. TEX. CONST. ANN. art. XVI, § 50(a)(6)(M)(ii).
24. Hinton, 533 S.W.3d 50–51.
25. Id. at 51 (citing TEX. CONST. ANN. art. XVI, § 50(a)(6)(M)(ii)).
26. Id.
27. Id. at 51 n.4 (citing 7 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 153.1(3)).
28. 41 S.W.3d 331 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2017, no pet.).
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foreclosure sale. Reynoso signed a deed of trust encumbering her home,
which contained a clause acknowledging that: (1) Reynoso’s right to oc-
cupy the premises ceased upon the sale of the property; and (2) Reynoso
had no rights to occupy the property without the new owner’s consent.
Dibs US, Inc. purchased the property at foreclosure and sent a notice to
vacate. When Reynoso failed to do so, Dibs filed a forcible detainer ac-
tion and right of possession was granted to Dibs by the justice court and
affirmed by the county court. Reynoso appealed that ruling, claiming that
the Texas forcible detainer provisions violated her due process rights and
that she should be entitled to possession during the pendency of her suit
for title in a district court. Texas law is well settled on these issues, but the
court dutifully walked through each of Reynoso’s issues.
First, Reynoso challenged subject matter jurisdiction of the justice
court and county court; however, the forcible detainer action clearly
grants subject matter jurisdiction to the appropriate justice court for for-
cible detainer actions relating to possession of property, and grants the
county court jurisdiction for an appeal therefrom.29 The only exception is
when the resolution of the possession issue “cannot be adjudicated with-
out first determining title.”30 However, in this case, the holdover/suffer-
ance clause in the deed of trust specified the grantor of the deed of trust
would become a tenant at sufferance, which allowed the trial court to
“resolve possession without resort to title.”31 Next, Reynoso asserted due
process clause violations based on the holdover/sufferance clause and the
deprivation of her right to litigate possession concurrent with her wrong-
ful foreclosure action. The Fourteenth Houston Court of Appeals recog-
nized that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the
U.S. Constitution32 has both procedural and substantive components.33 A
substantive due process violation occurs when the government deprives
an individual of a constitutionally protected right by an arbitrary use of
power, such as legislative action. The court noted that “[w]hen neither a
suspect classification nor fundamental right is involved,” courts use “the
deferential rational-basis test” to determine whether it is “‘fairly debata-
ble’ that the statute or conduct rationally relates to a legitimate govern-
ment interest.”34 On the other hand, procedural due process principles
protect persons from a “mistaken or unjustified deprivation of life, liberty
or property.”35 Therefore, procedural “[d]ue process requires notice and
an opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful
manner with respect to a decision affecting an individual’s property
29. Id. at 336; see TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 24.004.
30. Reynoso, 541 S.W.3d at 337.
31. Id. at 337–38.
32. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (citing Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 331
(1986)).
33. Reynoso, 541 S.W.3d at 338 (citing Daniels, 474 U.S. at 331).
34. Id. at 339 (citing In re Estate of Touring, 775 S.W.2d 39, 42 (Tex. App.—Houston
[14th Dist.] 1989, no pet.); Gatesco Q.M. Ltd. v. City of Hous., 503 S.W.3d 607, 618 (Tex.
App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2016, no pet.)).
35. Id. (citing Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179, 191 (1988)).
324 SMU ANNUAL TEXAS SURVEY [Vol. 5
rights.”36 But, the due process protection guarantees “do not extend to
private conduct abridging individual rights,”37 as opposed to governmen-
tal actions. Consequently, the deed of trust with a holdover/sufferance
clause did not trigger due process protections, because those actions were
between individuals without state action.38 The only possible state action
was enactment of the Texas Property Code section on forcible detainer,39
but due process does not override state court systems if there is a require-
ment for notice and an opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and
manner.40 Thus, Reynoso received due process having received adequate
notice and opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a mean-
ingful manner with respect to private conduct abridging individual
rights.41 A deed of trust with such holdover/sufferance clause does not
trigger due process protections between individuals and without state
action.
Reynoso also argued that denial of her right to litigate possession and
title in the same court violated her due process rights for shelter and pos-
session of property; however, the court held, using the rational basis test,
that the claim for shelter and right to retain possession of one’s home is
not a fundamental interest protected in the Constitution.42 Therefore,
Reynoso had no right under the due process clause to litigate possession
and title issues together in a state district court.
2. Jurisdiction on Title Issues
Praise Deliverance Church v. Jelinis, LLC43 also involved a forcible de-
tainer action after foreclosure. Praise Deliverance Church (the Church)
granted a deed of trust on ten tracts of land, some of which were vacant
land. At a non-judicial foreclosure sale, the property was acquired by Je-
linis, LLC and HREAL Company, LLC (purchasers). The purchasers
sent eviction notices and petitioned for possession, which was awarded.
Initially, the Church challenged jurisdiction of the justice and county
courts based on title issues, relying on a docket notation in the justice
court indicating “title issues.”44 However, the First Houston Court of Ap-
peals viewed such notation as inconsistent with the judgment for posses-
sion. The purchasers challenged the jurisdiction of the appellate court
because possession was no longer an issue because the Church failed to
file a supersedeas bond after the possession judgment, relying on Texas
Property Code Section 24.00745 to the effect that a county court final
judgment in an eviction suit may not be appealed on the issue of posses-
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 340.
39. See TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 24.002.
40. Reynosa, 541 S.W.3d at 341.
41. Id. at 342.
42. Id. at 343 (citing Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 74 (1972)).
43. 536 S.W.3d 849 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2017, pet. denied).
44. Id. at 852.
45. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 24.007.
2019] Real Property 325
sion unless the premises are being used for residential purposes only.46
Based on the failure to file a supersedeas bond, the purchasers obtained a
writ of possession and ultimately obtained possession, thereby dispossess-
ing the Church and using such non-possession as the basis for alleging
that the appeal was moot. The court of appeals concluded that the lack of
possession of the property might result in a new forcible detainer action
by the Church to evict the purchasers and, therefore, the appeal was not
moot.47 Despite this majority ruling, there is a vigorous dissent by Justice
Keyes, suggesting this is a case of first impression under Texas Property
Code Section 24.007 and Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 510.3(e),
regarding appellate procedure on forcible detainer actions.48 Justice
Keyes believed the appellate court lacked jurisdiction because the prop-
erty had a commercial use; therefore, the residential use exception did
not apply.49
Paselk v. Bayview Loan Servicing, LLC50 reaffirmed that issues of title
are not to be litigated in a forcible detainer action brought in the justice
court. Bayview, as the purchaser at a foreclosure sale, brought a forcible
detainer action against Paselk for failure to surrender possession after
foreclosure. Paselk appealed the judgment of possession in favor of
Bayview based on “title issues” related to payment defaults.51 The Texar-
kana Court of Appeals held that Bayview provided evidence satisfying all
the forcible detainer elements: (1) that it owned the property by virtue of
the substitute trustee deed; (2) that the occupants were a tenant at suffer-
ance pursuant to the specific terms of the deed of trust; (3) that the occu-
pants received notices to vacate; and (4) that the occupants failed to
vacate the premises.52 Having proven the elements of forcible detainer,
Bayview prevailed on the issue of possession and the title issue would
have to be brought in a separate district court action.53
3. Supersedeas Bonds
In a supersedeas bond case, In re Invum Three, LLC,54 the purchaser
at foreclosure brought a forcible detainer action. The county court judg-
ment for possession was rendered on April 18, 2017, although the occu-
pant was not present at the trial. A writ of possession was granted on May
1 and the constable posted the writ of possession at the property on May
4. That same day, the occupant filed a motion to stay the writ of posses-
sion and the trial court, on May 5, entered an order staying the writ of
possession. The purchaser brought a writ of mandamus to force the court
46. Jelinis, 536 S.W.3d at 853.
47. Id. at 854.
48. Id. at 856; see TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 24.007; TEX. R. CIV. P. 510.3(e).
49. Jelinis, 536 S.W.3d at 858.
50. 528 S.W.3d 790 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2017, no pet.).
51. Id. at 791.
52. Id. at 793.
53. Id. at 793–94.
54. 530 S.W.3d 748 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2017, no pet.).
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to enforce its writ of possession, which the Fourteenth Houston Court of
Appeals upheld based upon the strict requirement of Texas Rules of Civil
Procedure Rule 510.13,55 that a judgment of the county court cannot be
stayed unless a supersedeas bond is filed within ten days from the judg-
ment. The occupant missed that deadline; therefore, the order could not
be stayed.56
4. Possession Determination
Jimenez v. McGeary57 addressed two additional issues with regard to
forcible detainer actions after a foreclosure. Jimenez’s property was fore-
closed in August 2010. Four years later, the Federal National Mortgage
Association (FNMA) filed a forcible detainer action and before that pro-
ceeding was finally adjudicated, FNMA sold the property to McGeary
and his son in June 2016. After a notice to vacate, McGeary filed a forci-
ble detainer action and possession was granted to McGeary. Jimenez
complained that McGeary’s son was not a party to the forcible detainer
action and was an indispensable party, thereby requiring the action to be
dismissed. However, the Fort Worth Court of Appeals determined that
the issue being addressed was a right of immediate possession and that
McGeary’s son was not an indispensable party with respect to such adju-
dication.58 Jimenez also complained that the notice to vacate was insuffi-
cient under Texas Property Code Sections 24.002 and 24.00559 because
the notice was not on behalf of both owners, McGeary and his son. The
court considered evidence from McGeary’s attorney stating that both
sent a notice and determined that it was evidence that the notice was sent
by McGeary and his son.60 Though not dictum, the court spent little ef-
fort in analyzing this issue; therefore, some caution should be exercised in
using this as judicial precedent on this issue.
In yet another issue, Jimenez complained that the verifications in the
pleadings were signed by McGeary’s attorney instead of McGeary indi-
vidually. The court of appeals cited numerous cases supporting the verifi-
cation of a petition in a forceful detainer action involving a corporate
party by that party’s agent, and extended that reasoning to an individual
plaintiff’s attorney.61 Supporting this conclusion, the court noted the pro-
visions of various rules defining “plaintiff”62 and a “party,”63 and that
55. TEX. R. CIV. P. 510.13.
56. In re Invum Three, LLC, 530 S.W.3d at 750. This is consistent with Hernandez v.
U.S. Bank Trust, 527 S.W.3d 307, 310 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2017, no pet.), which was re-
ported during the prior Survey period, which denied an appeal because the supersedeas
bond hearing occurred after the ten-day posting period.
57. 542 S.W.3d 810 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2018, pet. denied).
58. Id. at 812.
59. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. §§ 24.002, 24.005.
60. Jiminez, 542 S.W.3d at 813.
61. Id.
62. TEX. R. CIV. P. 500.2(u).
63. Id. 500.2(s).
2019] Real Property 327
Rule 500.464 permits an authorized agent or attorney to represent an indi-
vidual in an eviction case. The verification by McGeary’s counsel stated
his authority to make the verification and swore that the facts contained
were “both within his personal knowledge and true and correct.”65 Fi-
nally, Jimenez claimed that McGeary could not rely on the tenancy at
sufferance provision in the deed of trust because he was not in privity of
contract. However, the court of appeals held that no contract is required
for a party to be subject to a forcible detainer action.66
5. Landlord-Tenant Relationship
In Jelinis, LLC v. Hiran,67 the Fourteenth Houston Court of Appeals
addressed, in a post-foreclosure forcible detainer action, the requisites for
the jurisdiction of the court to determine the issue of possession. Hiran
signed a home equity note and mortgage and later defaulted on same.
The note, originally made to Long Beach Mortgage, was transferred to
Deutsche Bank, which filed suit in a district court for declaratory judg-
ment and an order authorizing the foreclosure of the homestead prop-
erty. The district court granted judgment to Deutsche Bank, which
foreclosed and sold the property to Jelinis, which filed a forcible detainer
action against Hiran. Hiran filed a second suit in the district court alleging
title issues based upon a claim that the original mortgagee had switched
pages in the note and deed of trust changing the rate of interest from a
two percent fixed rate to an eight percent adjustable rate. The second
district court granted a temporary injunction to Hiran enjoining Jelinis
from its eviction action. Jelinis appealed, arguing the justice court had
exclusive jurisdiction to determine possession of the property.
The jurisdiction of the justice court was the primary issue of the case
and was summed up by the court of appeals in the following summary of
the law: “The justice court has jurisdiction over its forcible detainer case
and a district court may not enjoin a justice court from hearing a forcible
detainer case if the justice court does not have to make a determination
regarding title.”68 Jelinis relied upon the tenancy-at-sufferance clause
contained in the deed of trust,69 whereas Hiran alleged that the note and
deed of trust were void due to the alteration of terms of the documents.70
In order to avoid the combined and intertwined issues of possession and
title requiring a district court determination, the court of appeals looked
to see if, first, there was a landlord tenant relationship,71 noting that the
“lack of such a relationship indicates that the case may present a title
64. Id. 500.4(a).
65. Jimenez, 542 S.W.3d at 814.
66. Id. (citing Brooks v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. 05-1600616-CV, 2017 WL
3887296, at *9 (Tex. App.—Dallas Sept. 6, 2017, no pet.) (mem. op.)).
67. 557 S.W.3d 159 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2018, pet. denied).
68. Id. at 166.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 162.
71. Id. at 167.
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issue.”72 The court found the deed of trust contained a tenancy-at-suffer-
ance clause, and determined that it created an issue of possession sepa-
rate and apart from the issue on title.73 Hiran continued to assert that a
landlord-tenant relationship could not be based on a void deed of trust.74
Negating Hiran’s argument, the court looked at both Yarbrough v.
Household Financial Corp. III75 and Wade v. Household Financial Corp.
III.76 In the Yarbrough case, the deed of trust contained a tenancy-at-
sufferance clause; however, Yarbrough alleged the foreclosure sale was
void because the deed of trust was forged.77 The Yarbrough decision was
based on the validity of the original deed of trust which established the
tenancy-at-sufferance provision, unlike the Hiran case, which merely
challenged a defective foreclosure processing.78 The Wade case was
deemed to support the court’s decision because, in Wade, there was no
challenge to the execution of the deed of trust, the validity of the tenancy-
at-sufferance clause, or as to forgery.79 Therefore, there was no intertwin-
ing of possession and title issues.80
III. CREDITOR/DEBTOR/GUARANTIES
A. ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
DeRock v. DHM Ventures, LLC81 is a reminder that the statute of limi-
tation on a debt action is subject to a written acknowledgement of the
debt which constitutes a separate cause of action on which the statute of
limitation begins anew. DHM Ventures executed a note and deed of trust
to secure a debt that had a two-year term and was not timely paid. How-
ever, the debtor continued to make principal and interest payments on
the debt, which was acquired by DeRock four years after its maturity
date. When principal and interest payments stopped, DeRock brought
suit on the debt. In a motion for summary judgment, the debtor alleged
the lapse of the four-year limitation on the debt, and the plaintiff alleged
acknowledgement of the new debt.82 While this may substantively be a
warning to practitioners about acknowledging debt previously barred by
limitation, this case was decided on procedural aspects of pleading the
72. Id.
73. Id. (citing Pinnacle Premier Props., Inc. v. Breton, 447 S.W.3d 558, 564 (Tex.
App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no pet.) (op. on reh’g.)).
74. Id.
75. 455 S.W.3d 277 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2015, no pet.).
76. No. 06-15-00074-CV, 2016 WL 741872 (Tex. App.—Texarkana Feb. 25, 2016, no
pet.) (mem. op.).
77. Hiran, 557 S.W.3d at 168.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 169–70.
80. Id. at 170.
81. 556 S.W.3d 831 (Tex. 2018).
82. Id. at 833, 834. The supreme court noted the elements of acknowledgement were
that it must “(1) be in writing and signed by the party to be charged; (2) contain an une-
quivocal acknowledgment of the justness or the existence of the particular obligations; and
(3) refer to the obligation and express a willingness to honor that obligation.” Id. at 834
(citing Stine v. Stewart, 80 S.W.3d 586, 591 (Tex. 2002)).
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acknowledgement cause of action. The defendant’s recitation of facts for
an acknowledgement was not included in the “causes of action portion of
the pleadings” but rather in the “avoidance of defendants’ limitation de-
fense” section of the pleading.83 Although the court of appeals held the
defendant failed to properly plead the action, the Texas Supreme Court
overruled and remanded because the plaintiff had used the word “ac-
knowledgement” in the amended petition, detailed the evidence relied
upon for the acknowledgement cause of action, and attached exhibits
(emails, checks, bank statements and tax returns) relating to such cause
of action.84 This was sufficient to provide fair notice of an acknowledge-
ment cause of action, and the place of insertion in the pleadings was
immaterial.85
B. MATERIAL BREACH
Leonard v. Knight86 involved the determination of whether there was a
material breach of a settlement agreement. To settle a prior lawsuit, Leo-
nard and Knight entered into a settlement agreement whereby Leonard
signed a note for four years of principal and interest payments with a
single balloon payment and Knight agreed to dismiss the prior lawsuit
with prejudice.87 After signing the settlement agreement and the note,
Leonard made all of his monthly payments except the final balloon pay-
ment. Knight never filed the required dismissal with prejudice for the
prior lawsuit, although the trial court dismissed the underlying lawsuit
without prejudice for lack of prosecution.88 When Knight sued on the
balloon payment default, Leonard responded that his performance was
excused because of Knight’s breach of a material obligation (being the
dismissal with prejudice of the underlying suit). Knight’s motion for sum-
mary judgment was granted and affirmed on appeal. In support of its con-
clusion, the Fourteenth Houston Court of Appeals noted that in
determining materiality of a breach, courts should consider “the extent to
which the nonbreaching party will be deprived of the benefit that it rea-
sonably could have anticipated from full performance.”89 Although
Knight admitted he failed to dismiss the prior lawsuit with prejudice, the
court concluded that Leonard did not carry the burden of presenting evi-
dence that the breach was of a material nature, because Leonard did not
prove he was “deprived of the benefit he reasonably expected to receive
from the settlement.”90 The court also noted that there was no evidence
83. Id. at 834.
84. Id. at 835.
85. Id. at 836.
86. 551 S.W.3d 905 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2018, no pet.).
87. Id. at 908.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 910 (citing Hernandez v. Gulf Grp. Lloyds, 875 S.W.2d 691, 693 (Tex. 1994)).
90. Id. (citing FedGess Shopping Ctrs., Ltd. v. MNC SSP, Inc., No. 14-07-00211-CV,
2007 Tex. App. LEXIS 9802, at *3 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Dec. 18, 2007, no pet.)
(mem. op.)).
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that Knight had the ability to dismiss the claims in the prior lawsuit at the
time Leonard failed to make final payments.
Consequently, the court affirmed the trial court’s holding because Leo-
nard did not meet his evidentiary burden of proof on the issue of material
breach.91 Though this case was decided on procedural issues, the authors
question some of the substantive provisions. Most notably, the failure of
Knight to file the dismissal with prejudice was not only a breach of a
condition of the settlement agreement, it was Knight’s only obligation
and condition under the settlement agreement. The authors consider the
breach of Knight’s sole obligation material. The court seemed influenced
by Leonard’s failure to make demand of Knight to file a dismissal with
prejudice prior to Leonard’s failure to make the final balloon payment.92
The court acknowledged that the expected benefit was the termination of
the prior lawsuit in a manner in which it could not be revived.93 However,
the court ignored the distinction between a dismissal with prejudice and a
dismissal without prejudice.94 In summary, this case represents only a
narrow decision based on the procedural defects of Leonard in failing to
specify the materiality of the breach; but nevertheless, the authors believe
it should not be considered authoritative on the substantive issue of mate-
rial breach and the distinction between dismissing with or without
prejudice.
C. EFFECT OF BANKRUPTCY DISMISSAL
The Tyler Court of Appeals discussed in Badalich v. First National
Bank of Winnsboro95 the enforceability of an agreement reached during
bankruptcy but the bankruptcy was subsequently dismissed. Badalich ex-
ecuted numerous notes and deeds of trust to the bank over a period of
time but defaulted on payment. When the bank filed suit on the debt, the
debtor filed for a Chapter 13 bankruptcy (later converted to a Chapter 11
bankruptcy).96 During the course of the Chapter 11 proceeding, the credi-
tor and debtor entered into a refinance agreement which restructured the
payments under the existing debt at a lower interest rate. After eighteen
months in bankruptcy, the debtor dismissed the Chapter 11 proceeding,
advising the court that a voluntary agreement among creditors could be
obtained through the means of a new lending source. Upon dismissal, the
bank filed suit for collection of the underlying debt evidenced by the
notes and deeds of trust, as unmodified by the bankruptcy refinance
agreement. Badalich contended that the refinance agreement was an ac-
91. Id. at 911.
92. See id. at 910.
93. Id. at 911.
94. See id. at 910 (citing Mossler v. Shields, 818 S.W.2d 752, 754 (Tex. 1991)). The
court, although claiming Leonard presented no authority for such distinction, noted that a
“dismissal with prejudice does operate as a determination on the merits . . . .”
95. 550 S.W.3d 676 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2017, pet. denied).
96. Id. at 678.
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cord and satisfaction of the underlying debts and should continue after
the bankruptcy dismissal.
However, the Tyler Court of Appeals concluded that the dismissal of
the bankruptcy proceeding effected a return of the parties to their pre-
petition status.97 Specifically, the court quoted from a Northern District
of Texas bankruptcy case noting that “[t]o the extent possible, dismissal
of [a] bankruptcy petition reverses what has transpired during bank-
ruptcy.”98 Consequently, because the bankruptcy refinance agreement
was unenforceable, the bank could sue and enforce the original notes
without regard to the bankruptcy refinance agreement.99 This is instruc-
tive to practitioners who should take heed of contracts executed during
bankruptcy before considering a dismissal of such bankruptcy proceeding.
D. SUMMARY JUDGMENT AFFIDAVIT KNOWLEDGE
Rogers v. RREF II CB Acquisitions, LLC100 involved a suit on a breach
of note but was decided on the sufficiency of affidavit evidence in support
of a motion for summary judgment for the creditor. The most important
aspects related to issues concerning the personal knowledge of the affiant
in affidavits supporting a motion for summary judgment. In considering
the various affidavits, the Corpus Christi Court of Appeals noted that
Rule 166a(f)101 requires affidavits supporting summary judgment to be
made “on personal knowledge” which must “unequivocally represent the
facts as disclosed in the affidavit to be true and within the affiant’s per-
sonal knowledge.”102 Further, the court noted the affidavit “must disclose
the basis on which the affiant has personal knowledge of the facts
asserted.”103
Personal knowledge may be established by (1) the affiant’s position or
job responsibilities; (2) knowledge that can be reasonably assumed based
on the affidavit sufficiently describing the relationship between the affi-
ant and the case; (3) a pertinent review of the records establishing the
requisite knowledge; and (4) the custodian of records with a relationship
to the facts.104 Sufficient personal knowledge was established here by the
affidavits submitted by the creditor. The court noted how each affidavit
referenced the following facts: (1) a representation of direct and unquali-
fied claim of personal knowledge; (2) the details of the role in the com-
pany which made assumption of personal knowledge appropriate; (3) the
direct control and custody over account and records; (4) control and re-
view of the pertinent records; (5) custodial capacity over the records; and
97. Id. at 680 (citing Czyzewski v. Jevic Holding Court, 137 S. Ct. 973, 978 (2017)).
98. Id. (citing In re Keener, 268 B.R. 912, 919 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2001)).
99. Id. at 682.
100. 533 S.W.3d 419 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2016, no pet.).
101. TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(f).
102. Rogers, 553 S.W.3d at 428 (citing Humphreys v. Caldwell, 888 S.W. 2d 469, 470
(Tex. 1999) (per curiam) (orig. proceeding)).
103. Id.
104. Id. at 429.
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(6) verification of the accounts.105 But, Rogers argued that some of the
documentation offered for summary judgment evidence were hearsay, al-
leging that the servicer’s affidavits were insufficient as business records of
the actual creditor.106 The court recited the elements under Texas Rules
of Evidence 803(6)107 for the hearsay exception to be admissible, includ-
ing that: “(1) the documents were made and kept in the regular course of
business; (2) such recordkeeping was the regular practice of the business;
(3) the records were made at or near the time of the event; and (4) the
records were made by a knowledgeable person in the course of busi-
ness.”108 Further, the hearsay exception for records from a third party
were admissible if “(1) the document is incorporated and kept in the
course of the testifying witness’s business, (2) that business typically relies
upon the accuracy of the document’s content, and (3) the circumstances
otherwise indicate the document’s trustworthiness.”109 The servicer’s affi-
davit clearly reflected how the servicing information was incorporated
into its records, in the regular course of its business, and how that infor-
mation was relied upon in both loan sales and in making demands for
outstanding debt.110 As to the trustworthiness prong of the third-party
record test, the court stated that it could look at the totality of the affida-
vits and other supporting exhibits to satisfy such element.111
E. ANTI-DEFICIENCY—FAIR MARKET VALUE
Silberstein v. Trustmark National Bank112 discussed the determination
of fair market value in an anti-deficiency suit. Silberstein owned ten resi-
dential properties subject to loans which were cross-collateralized and
cross-defaulted. There was a default and a foreclosure. Silberstein ap-
pealed an adverse judgment on the fair market value of the property de-
termined under the anti-deficiency statute in the Texas Property Code.113
In this battle of appraisers, Silberstein’s appraiser used gross rental in-
come less expenses for an income valuation; the creditor’s (Trustmark)
appraiser used the annual rent adjusted by capitalization rates from 12%
to 20%.114 The jury determined the fair market value to be the exact
numbers established by the creditor’s appraiser and Silberstein attacked
105. Id. at 430.
106. Id. at 431.
107. TEX. R. EVID. 803(6).
108. Rogers, 553 S.W.3d at 432.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 433–34.
111. Id. at 434. Consider how the affidavits discussed in Rogers can be distinguished
from Villanova v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., 511 S.W.3d 88 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2014, no
pet.), discussed by the authors in the prior annual Survey. See J. Richard White et al., Real
Property, 4 SMU ANN. TEX. SURV. 357, 364–65 (2018). In Villanova, the creditor’s affidavit
of its Vice President of Loan Servicing and Default Operations was deemed insufficient for
failure to establish the personal knowledge of the affiant.
112. 533 S.W.3d 403 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2016, pet. denied).
113. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 51.003(b).
114. Silberstein, 533 S.W.3d at 406. The higher the cap rate, the lower the value of the
property. Id.
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the jury’s verdict as being against the great weight and preponderance of
the evidence. The Fourteenth Houston Court of Appeals agreed, noting
that the term “fair market value” is not statutorily defined in the anti-
deficiency statute.115 Its common definition is a value determined by a
willing buyer and seller, with neither being under an obligation to buy or
sell, and that definition is approved under the Texas Tax Code.116 How-
ever, the Texas Supreme Court has held that the fair market value defini-
tion in the anti-deficiency statute “does not equate precisely to the
common, or historical, definition.”117 Fair market value in the anti-defi-
ciency context means the historical definition as modified by other evi-
dence which the Texas Property Code118 authorizes.119 Such other
evidence includes: “(1) expert opinion testimony; (2) comparable sales;
(3) anticipated marketing time and holding cost; (4) cost of sale; and (5) a
discount to be applied to future sales price or cash flow to arrive at a
current fair market value (i.e., the discounted value).”120 Of the three
types of valuation methods (comparable sales, cost method and income
method),121 the court of appeals noted that the favored judicial method
was the comparable sales approach.122 Nevertheless, even using the com-
parable sales method, such “comps” must be based on (1) voluntary tran-
sitions; (2) near in time and vicinity to the subject sale and property; and
(3) involve property with similar characteristics.123 Otherwise, the cost
approach (which tends to set the upper limit of true market value) and
the income approach are acceptable valuation methodologies.124
Silberstein’s appraiser’s use of the income method was competent evi-
dence because the appraiser testified as to why and the amount of the
value reduction to accommodate for expenses, that such adjustments
were based on his experience, and that the cap rate was a fair cap rate for
the industry at the time of the foreclosure sale (being from 6% to 10%,
and that the 6% cap rate was generally used for commercial properties,
which justified his 8% cap rate).125 On the other hand, Trustmark’s ap-
praiser’s use of comparable sales approach was determined not probative
evidence, because the comparable sales for six of the ten properties were
based on foreclosure sales (not voluntary sales), and there was no adjust-
ment in the appraisal amount based on the fact that the sales were not
between willing buyers and sellers.126
115. Id. at 410.
116. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 1.04(7).
117. Silberstein, 533 S.W.3d at 410 (citing Plainscapital Bank v. Martin, 459 S.W.3d 550,
556–57 (Tex. 2015)).
118. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 51.003(b).
119. Silberstein, 533 S.W.3d at 411.
120. Id. at 410–11.





126. Id. at 411–12.
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For an expert opinion to have probative weight, the bases and reasons
for the expert’s opinion must be probative evidence not merely a conclu-
sionary statement of the expert.127 The value opinion offered in the
Trustmark appraisal provided no evidentiary support and was a conclu-
sionary statement not constituting probative evidence of market value.128
However, Silberstein’s position could not prevail if the jury’s verdict was
not supported by the preponderance of the evidence.129 The court of ap-
peals concluded that the Trustmark’s appraisal testimony on replacement
cost could establish a range of fair market value on a cost replacement
basis, but the jury’s finding as to fair market value did not fall within the
range of fair market value on a cost replacement basis.130 The jury’s find-
ings were “contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence.”131
Therefore, Silberstein had not established fair market value.
F. STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS WAIVER
Godoy v. Wells Fargo Bank132 involved a new aspect of waivers under
the Texas anti-deficiency statute.133 Prior precedent is clear, as an-
nounced in LaSalle Bank N. A. v. Sleutel134 and later announced by the
Texas Supreme Court in Moayedi v. Interstate 35/Chisam R.D., L.P.,135
that a general waiver of rights and defenses is sufficient to waive the off-
set claims under the Texas anti-deficiency statute.136 This case dealt with
whether such a generic waiver is sufficient for a waiver of the special two-
year statute of limitations in the anti-deficiency statute.137 Godoy guaran-
teed a note payable to Wells Fargo; Wells Fargo sued Godoy to collect the
deficiency three years after the foreclosure sale. In defense, Godoy as-
serted the two-year limitation period under the anti-deficiency statute.138
However, Wells Fargo asserted that the guaranty agreement contained a
waiver of that special two year statute of limitation and asserted that it
only needed to file its claim within the standard four year limitation pe-
riod. The guaranty agreement read:
Guarantor also waives any and all rights or defenses arising by rea-
son of . . . (E) any statute of limitations, if at any time any action or
suit brought by Lender against Guarantor is commenced, there is
outstanding indebtedness of Borrower to Lender which is not barred
by any applicable statute of limitations . . .139
127. Id. at 412.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 413.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. 542 S.W.3d 50 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2017, pet. granted), aff’d 2019
WL 2064538 (Tex. May 10, 2019).
133. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 51.003.
134. 289 F.3d 837, 842 (5th Cir. 2002).
135. 438 S.W.3d 1, 6 (Tex. 2014).
136. Godoy, 542 S.W.3d at 52, 53.
137. Id. at 53.
138. See PROP. CODE § 51.003(a).
139. Godoy, 542 S.W.3d at 52, 53.
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In its analysis, the Fourteenth Houston Court of Appeals relied on
Moayedi, in which the supreme court held that a broad general waiver
was sufficient for a waiver of a right of offset under the anti-deficiency
statute which is an “affirmative defense.”140 The court of appeals contin-
ued, reasoning that because a statute of limitations is also an affirmative
defense, that the Moayedi decision would also encompass a waiver of the
special two-year limitation defense under the anti-deficiency statute.141
However, Chief Justice Frost stringently dissented, alleging that Moayedi
did not overrule the long standing Texas Supreme Court’s position an-
nounced in Simpson v. McDonald,142 “that an agreement made in ad-
vance to completely waive the statute of limitations is void as against
Texas public policy.”143 This case is subject to a filed petition and further
clarification from the supreme court should be anticipated.
G. GARNISHMENT—BANKRUPTCY DISCHARGE
Leslie William Adams & Associates v. AMOCO Federal Credit
Union144 determined the effect of a bankruptcy discharge upon a garnish-
ment action. The judgment debtor, Martinez, owed Adams & Associates
attorneys’ fees for handling a prior case; the law firm obtained a judg-
ment against Martinez for such fees, and brought a garnishment action
against the credit union. Two weeks after the judgment was entered in
favor of the law firm, Martinez filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy, which was
prior to levy on the writ of execution. At issue was whether the bank-
ruptcy discharge voided the underlying state court’s garnishment judg-
ment. The Fourteenth Houston Court of Appeals held that the discharge
voided the underlying garnishment.145 Under Texas law, a judgment in
garnishment is not self-executing.146 A writ of execution cannot be issued
until thirty days after the judgment becomes final.147 Consequently,
“ownership of property subject to the judgment does not transfer until a
writ of execution has been issued and levied.”148 Therefore, the bank-
ruptcy discharge voided any judgment of personal liability of Martinez
and operated as an injunction against the continuation of any action or
employment of process to recover such debt.149
140. Id. at 53.
141. Id.
142. 179 S.W.2d 239, 243 (Tex. 1944).
143. Godoy, 542 S.W.3d at 56.
144. 537 S.W.3d 571 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2017, no pet.).
145. Id. at 576.
146. Id. (citing TEX. R. CIV. P. 621 (judgments “shall be enforced by execution or other
appropriate process”)).
147. TEX. R. CIV. P. 627.
148. Leslie Wm. Adams & Assocs., 537 S.W.3d at 576 (quoting Baytown State Bank v.
Nimmons, 904 S.W.2d 902, 906 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1995, pet. denied)); see
also TEX. R. CIV. P. 622, 629, 637–43.
149. Leslie Wm. Adams & Assocs., 537 S.W.3d at 576.
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H. GUARANTY—CONSTRUCTION OF “INDEBTEDNESS”
Comerica Bank v. Progressive Trade Enterprises150 involved a suit on a
note and guaranty and the type of evidence required to prove same.151 In
proving the promissory note, Comerica’s evidence included testimony
from the vice president for special assets and custodian of records that
the bank held the original note which it acquired by merger with Sterling
Bank, the original lender, but only a copy was produced at trial. Progres-
sive challenged Comerica for not producing the original note at trial. The
court entered a take nothing judgment against Comerica. On appeal, the
Fourteenth Houston Court of Appeals concluded that Comerica had
demonstrated it was the legal owner and holder of the note based on: (1)
sworn testimony of its custodian testifying that the note presented at trial
was a true and correct copy of the original note; (2) Progressive was
deemed the maker of the note because it did not dispute that fact; (3)
evidence that the original note was located in Comerica’s collateral de-
partment; (4) evidence that the note had not been transferred to any
other entity; and (5) evidence that the note had been acquired in Comer-
ica’s merger with Sterling Bank.152
As to its suit on the guaranty,153 Comerica failed to conclusively
demonstrate it was entitled to recovery. The specific definition of “in-
debtedness” in the guaranty agreement applied only for future debts if
the borrower did not meet lender’s creditworthiness standards which
would otherwise require a guaranty for its underwriting purposes.154 The
court determined that the guaranty was succeeded by numerous new
promissory notes which were not supported by a new guaranty; therefore,
the subject guaranty was no longer applicable because the borrower must
have been creditworthy on its own without the need for a guaranty.155
I. GUARANTY ACCEPTANCE
Norris v. Texas Development Co.156 was a breach of guaranty case. A
tenant, ARC Designs, fell behind in its rent payments to the landlord,
Texas Development Company. In an effort to restructure the rental pay-
150. 544 S.W.3d 459 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2018, no pet.).
151. Id. at 463. The elements for recovery are proof of (1) the note; (2) the obligor’s
signature on the note; (3) the plaintiff’s status as the owner or holder of the note; and (4)
the balance thereof due and owing.
152. Id. at 463–64. This is just another nail in the coffin of the infamous “show me the
note” defense.
153. The elements for recovery on a guaranty are proof of (1) the existence and owner-
ship of the guaranty; (2) the terms of the guaranty; (3) occurrence of the conditions for
liability under the guaranty; and (4) failure or refusal of performance by the guarantor. Id.
at 465.
154. Id. at 466. The specific language was “[t]he term Indebtedness as used in this guar-
anty shall not include any obligations entered into between Borrower and Lender after the
date hereof . . . for which Borrower meets the Lender’s standard of creditworthiness based
on Borrower’s own assets and income without the addition of a guaranty . . . .” Id. (empha-
sis added).
155. Id.
156. 547 S.W.3d 656 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2018, no pet.).
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ments, the parties reached an oral agreement on the deferred base rent.
Part of the agreement was for the tenant’s owner, Norris, to guarantee
such deferred base rent payments. The tenant attempted to memorialize
the deferred base rent agreement and included such document in a letter
(September letter) which attached a guaranty signed by Norris. The Sep-
tember letter included a signature block for the landlord that it did not
sign at that time; rather, the landlord sent a counteroffer letter (October
letter) and attached the guaranty signed by Norris and transmitted with
the September letter. For reasons undiscussed in the opinion, the October
letter was never agreed to, but after sending the October letter, the land-
lord purportedly accepted the original offer. In the suit by the landlord
against the tenant and guarantor for failure to make payments under the
September letter, Norris countered that the October letter voided the
guaranty transmitted with the September letter. A summary judgment in
favor of the landlord was granted and appealed by the guarantor. The
Fourteenth Houston Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court, conclud-
ing, first, that Norris failed to argue that no contract existed, which was a
procedural waiver by Norris.157 The court construed the guaranty lan-
guage as not being conditioned upon the execution of the deferred base
rent agreement,158 based on the premise that in the construction of guar-
anties, the court must construe strictly any guaranty according to its pre-
cise terms.159 The guaranty identified “the amount guaranteed and the
terms of payment,”160 but the guaranty was “not conditioned upon the
parties’ acceptance of the specifics of the ‘Deferred Base Rent
Agreement.’”161
However, the exact language of the guaranty as quoted in the opin-
ion162 is contrary, in the authors’ opinion, to the court’s interpretation of
the guaranty. Notwithstanding the court’s conclusion that the guaranty
was not conditioned upon the acceptance of the Deferred Base Rent
Agreement, the authors disagree with that conclusion. Practitioners
should take note of this case but rely mostly on the procedural aspects as
to the guarantor’s failure to plead the existence of a valid contract, rather
than relying on such language in the guaranty not creating a condition to
its effectiveness.
157. Id. at 662.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 663.
161. Id.
162. The applicable guaranty provision read: “FOR VALUE RECEIVED, and in con-
sideration for, and as an inducement to THE TEXAS DEVELOPMENT COMPANY to
enter into the attached Deferred Base Rent Agreement, [guarantor] hereby guarantees
. . . .” Id. at 662 (emphasis added).
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IV. LANDLORD/TENANT/LEASES
A. SECURITY DEPOSITS
In Schneider v. Whatley,163 the El Paso Court of Appeals addressed for
the first time the bad faith element of Section 92.103 of the Texas Prop-
erty Code, which requires a landlord to “refund a security deposit to the
tenant on or before the 30th day after the date the tenant surrenders the
premises.”164 In this particular case, the tenant made a number of repairs
and improvements to the lease during the term.165 After the tenant
moved out on June 30, 2013, the landlord arguably complied with the
requirements of the Texas Property Code by sending the tenant a letter
approximately ten days later itemizing the list of required repairs, and
concluding that the tenant owed an additional $492.56 for such repairs.166
By sending the letter, the landlord believed that it had complied with the
requirements of the Texas Property Code, which presumes the landlord’s
bad faith if the landlord “fails either to return the security deposit or to
provide a written description and itemization of the deductions on or
before the 30th day after the date the tenant surrenders possession.”167
Unfortunately for the landlord, and landlords across the state of Texas,
the tenant sued for the return of their security deposit, and despite the
landlord’s prima facie compliance with the requirements of the law, the
trial court entered judgment against the landlord and found the landlord
liable for three times the amount of the security deposit for wrongfully
withholding the security deposit.168
The landlord appealed on the basis that there was no evidentiary sup-
port that it acted in bad faith in failing to return the security deposit dur-
ing the requisite thirty day period.169 The El Paso Court of Appeals
upheld the finding of the trial court that the landlord acted in bad faith.170
Although the landlord was able to overcome the presumption of bad faith
by sending the tenant a letter within thirty days, the landlord was still
held responsible for wrongfully withholding the security deposit beyond
the statutory thirty day period because of the nature of the charges the
landlord deducted from the security deposit.171
Although this case is very fact specific regarding the types of repairs
the landlord deducted from the security deposit (i.e. normal wear and
tear or pre-approved changes), it is an important warning for all residen-
tial landlords that merely sending an itemized statement within thirty
days is not sufficient to avoid the treble damages under Section 92.109 of
the Texas Property Code. The damages claimed by the landlord, and the
163. 535 S.W.3d 236 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2017, no pet.).
164. Id. at 240 (citing TEX. PROP CODE ANN. § 92.103).
165. Id. at 239.
166. Id. at 238.
167. Id. at 241.
168. Id. at 238; see TEX. PROP. CODE § 92.109(a).
169. Schneider, 535 S.W.3d at 240.
170. Id. at 242.
171. Id.
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amount of the security deposit held, must also be reasonable to avoid the
penalty. In this case, the tenant was able to prove that the landlord either
consented to various improvements or that the improvements were bene-
ficial and did not “damage” the property. Therefore, the court concluded
that the landlord had not incurred any real damage and failure to return
the security deposit within thirty days was bad faith under the statute.172
B. NON-COMPETE CLAUSES
Ho & Huang Properties, L.P. v. Parkway Dental Associates173 is a com-
plicated case that wound its way through the Texas court system for many
years and was ultimately settled in late 2018 by the Texas Supreme Court
denying the landlord’s petition. The basic facts can be summarized as fol-
lows. In 2004, Parkway Dental Associates, the tenant, leased office space
from Ho & Huang Properties, L.P., the landlord, for use as a dentist of-
fice.174 The lease contained a restrictive covenant that provided “[u]nless
a Default of this Lease has occurred and remains uncured upon the expi-
ration of any grace or notice periods, Landlord covenants and agrees that
Landlord shall not permit any portion of the Project to be used for a
Competitive Business.”175 The lease defined “Competitive Business” as
“Businesses practic[ing] . . . [g]eneral dentistry” and “Project” as “the
complex in which the leased premises were located.”176 In 2006, the land-
lord sold a part of the Project’s parking lot to a third party, who ulti-
mately resold the property to another party, who constructed a building
and leased it to a dental practice.177 In 2007, the tenant sued the landlord
for breach of the lease and anticipatory repudiation.178 The trial court
granted summary judgment in favor of the landlord and the tenant ap-
pealed. On appeal, the Houston Court of Appeals found that the trial
court erred in granting summary judgment and remanded the case for
findings of facts on certain materials issues.179 On remand, the jury found
in favor of the tenant with respect to the breach of the covenant by the
landlord and the landlord appealed.180 The court of appeals affirmed the
judgment of the trial court.181 The lesson in this case for all practitioners
is to carefully (and narrowly) define non-compete clauses in leases or
other restrictive covenants with an eye toward potentially foreseeable fu-
ture transactions or events to avoid this type of situation.
172. Id.
173. 529 S.W.3d 102 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2017, pet. denied).
174. Id. at 106.




179. Id. at 108.
180. Id.
181. Id.
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C. DAMAGES/ATTORNEY’S FEES
First Cash, Ltd. v. JQ-Parkdale, LLC182 provides two important prac-
tice tips for practitioners when it comes to cases related to breach of con-
tract.183 First, in order to obtain attorney fees for a breach of contract
case, including a lease, the contract or lease must explicitly authorize such
fees or the case must be brought against an “individual or corporation” in
order to fall within the parameters of the Texas Attorney’s Fees Stat-
ute.184 Limited liability companies, limited partnerships, trusts, and other
organizations that are not “corporations” are specifically excluded by the
Texas Attorney’s Fee Statute.185 Second, when proving damages related
to a breach of a lease it is essential to present evidence of the rent differ-
ential, which is the “difference between (1) the agreed rent and (2) the
actual market value of the remaining lease term.”186 In order to establish
“market value,” one must be able to present an “accepted offer,” not
merely the opinion of third parties on what the market value might be or
offers on other potential comparable properties.187
V. PURCHASER/SELLER
A. CONTRACTUAL INTERPRETATION/AMBIGUITY
In URI, Inc. v. Kleberg County,188 the Texas Supreme Court, as it
seems to do several times a year, once again found the need to correct a
lower court which found ambiguity in a contract where there was not
any.189 The case involves a settlement agreement between URI and Kle-
berg County over uranium mining operations. The settlement agreement
provided in relevant part as follows:
URI will not resume economic mining in KVD [Kingsville Dome]
Production Area 3 before it has submitted to the County Judge of
Kleberg County . . . [a sworn statement] that 90% or more of the
combined total of TCEQ production area baseline wells in KVD
Production Area 1 and any other wells in the production patterns
that URI sampled and for which baseline is available before mining
begins, . . . has been returned to suitability.190
URI had pre-mining samples from both 1985 and 1987, but only the
1985 data was publically available prior to the signing of the settlement
agreement. All of the lower courts who heard the case agreed with Kle-
berg County that the obligations of URI under the settlement agreement
had to be interpreted using only the 1985 publicly available data because
182. 538 S.W.3d 189 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2018, no pet.).
183. Id. at 194 (citing TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE. ANN. § 38.001(8)).
184. Id.
185. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE. ANN. § 38.001(8).
186. First Cash, 538 S.W.3d at 200 (citing Design Ctr. Venture v. Overseas Multi-
Projects Corp., 748 S.W.2d 469, 473 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1988, writ denied)).
187. Id.; see Hanks v. Gulf, Colo. & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 320 S.W.2d 333, 337 (Tex. 1959).
188. 543 S.W.3d 755 (Tex. 2018).
189. See id. at 763.
190. Id. at 758–59 (emphasis added).
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that is what Kleberg County expected to be used when they signed the
settlement agreement.191 The Texas Supreme Court overturned the lower
court’s findings and explicitly took the case to “reaffirm that the ‘facts
and circumstances’” in existence at the time a contract is executed are
only relevant to inform the meaning of the language the parties chose to
effectuate their accord if there is ambiguity.192 In construing an unambig-
uous contract or in determining whether an ambiguity exists, courts may
“not seek to use the parties’ intent beyond the meaning the contract lan-
guage reasonably yields when construed in context”193 and “facts and cir-
cumstances cannot be employed to make the language say what it
unambiguously does not say” or “to show that the parties probably
meant, or could have meant, something other than what their agreement
stated.”194
In XTO Energy, Inc. v. EOG Resources, Inc.,195 the San Antonio Court
of Appeals interpreted the meaning of a “Disposition Clause” contained
in both a Deed to Convey Property and a Deed of Trust used to secure
the payment of the purchase price for the same property. The question at
issue was whether the vendor’s lien in the Deed and the lien of the Deed
of Trust were against the entirety of the property conveyed or against
only a 1/8th royalty interest. The language in question stated:
It is further agreed and stipulated that grantee may make such dispo-
sition of seven-eighths [sic] (7/8) of the mineral rights as he may
deem fit, however, it further provides [sic] that the usual one-eighth
(1/8) royalty will be retained against the land for the protection of
the holder or holders of the notes, until the entire balance against the
land shall have been fully paid, with all interest thereon.196
The grantee later defaulted on repayment of the notes securing
purchase of the property and the grantors foreclosed. The successors of
the grantee argued that 7/8ths of the mineral interest were excluded from
the lien of the Deed of Trust and vendor’s lien in the Deed and that only
1/8 of the mineral interest were retained by the grantor until such time as
the notes securing the purchase of the property were repaid in full. The
heirs of the grantor argued that the notes securing payment of the
purchase price were secured in three different ways: (1) with a vendor’s
lien in the granting Deed; (2) with a Deed of Trust; and (3) with a 1/8
mineral interest.
The majority of the court of appeals sided with the grantors.197 The
court relied on the longstanding interpretation of the courts in Texas that
if a vendor’s lien is inserted in a Deed, the seller retains superior title to
191. Id. at 769.
192. Id. at 763.
193. Id.
194. Id. at 769 (citing Anglo-Dutch Petrol. Int’l, Inc. v. Greenberg Peden, P.C., 352
S.W.3d 445, 451 (Tex. 2011)).
195. 554 S.W.3d 127 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2018, pet. filed).
196. Id. at 131.
197. Id. at 141.
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the property and the purchase agreement remains executory until the
terms of the purchase have been fulfilled.198 As the court explained in
some detail, when the grantee of an interest subject to a vendor’s lien
sells the property, prior to completion of the purchase terms, the convey-
ance of the property is “a transfer of an equitable interest susceptible to
rescission [sic].”199
In a very interesting and somewhat compelling dissent, Justice Barnard
argued that by construing the Disposition Clause as merely another ave-
nue to secure repayment of the notes, the majority rendered the clause
meaningless.200 The dissent argued that if the vendor’s lien clearly en-
cumbered all of the property (mineral and surface) the 1/8 interest could
not act as “additional security” unless the drafter intended the 7/8 to be
carved out of the vendor’s lien. If that were the case, the 1/8 secured
repayment of the vendor’s lien and the remaining 7/8s was free and clear
of the vendor’s lien.201 The case has been appealed to the Texas Supreme
Court and it will be interesting to see if they take up the case. Given the
supreme court’s emphasis in recent years on ensuring that all clauses in
contract are interpreted together as one cohesive document, if at all pos-
sible, and the importance of not ignoring individual provisions to arrive at
the desired conclusion, the authors would not be surprised to see the su-
preme court take the case and side with dissent’s interpretation, which
one might argue does a better job of interpreting the contracts in ques-
tion by giving meaning to all, and not just a select part, of the language
used by the original drafters.
B. FIDUCIARY DUTY
In Texas Outfitters Ltd. v. Nicholson,202 the trial court found that the
holder of the executive rights for mineral interests owed a fiduciary duty
to the non-executive interest holders and awarded the non-executive min-
eral interest holders monetary damages for breach of the fiduciary
duty.203 The San Antonio Court of Appeals upheld the trial court’s find-
ing,204 but the Texas Supreme Court granted the executive rights holder’s
(Texas Outfitters) petition and executive rights holders across the state of
Texas are undoubtedly on pins and needles awaiting the outcome of the
petition. Given the facts of the case, explained in more detail below, the
outcome reached by the court of appeals seems to be the right answer
from an equity standpoint. However, arguably, the holding rather dra-
198. Id. at 138 (citing Glenn v. Lucas, 376 S.W.3d 268, 275 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2012,
no pet.)); see also Lusk v. Mintz, 625 S.W.2d 774, 775 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.]
1981, no writ) (citing State v. Forest Lawn Lot Owners Ass’n, 254 S.W.2d 87, 91 (1953)).
199. XTO Energy, Inc., 554 S.W.3d at 139 (citing Flag-Redfern Oil Co. v. Humble Expl.
Co., 744 S.W.2d 6, 8 (Tex. 1987)).
200. Id. at 141.
201. Id. at 144.
202. 534 S.W.3d 65 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2018, pet. granted), aff’d, 572 S.W.3d 647
(Tex. 2019).
203. Id. at 70.
204. Id. at 68.
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matically expands the fiduciary duty of executive rights holders and will
dramatically impact existing business practices of executive rights holders
in the state of Texas. It will also, almost undoubtedly, open the floodgates
to future litigation over breach of the executive rights holder’s fiduciary
duties.
The facts of the case are relatively straightforward. The Carter family
sold the surface estate and the executive rights to Texas Outfitters while
retaining the majority of the mineral interest.205 The transaction was par-
tially seller financed.206 Texas Outfitters then received multiple seemingly
competitive offers to lease the mineral interests that it turned down.207
The Carter family attempted to negotiate with Texas Outfitters but Texas
Outfitters refused to enter into a lease unless the Carter’s made a number
of concessions, including, but not limited to, giving up substantially more
of their mineral interests, agreeing to non-market surface restrictions, and
reducing the outstanding indebtedness on the seller financed promissory
note.208 Ultimately, the Carter family sued Texas Outfitters209 seeking to
compel a lease of the mineral interests. The holding by the San Antonio
Court of Appeals, that Texas Outfitters breached their fiduciary duty, re-
lied on a long line of Texas Supreme Court cases that have held that “the
executive owes other owners of the mineral interests a duty of ‘utmost
fair dealing.’”210
In Lesely v. Veterans Board of Texas,211 the Texas Supreme Court ap-
plied the standard to the refusal of an executive owner to lease property
“[i]f the refusal to lease is arbitrary or motivated by self-interest to the
non-executive’s detriment.”212 However, in recent years, the Texas Su-
preme Court has qualified this precedent to clarify that although the duty
is “fiduciary in nature” it does not require one to “place the interest of
the other party before its own.”213
It will be interesting to see if the Texas Supreme Court continues to
further narrow the Lesely precedent, and the definition of fiduciary duty,
with their holding in this case or swings back to a more traditional defini-
tion of fiduciary duty, which will arguably have significant impacts on
how the holders of executive rights currently operate in the state of
Texas.
C. DUE DILIGENCE/COMPLIANCE WITH CONTRACT TERMS
Freeman v. Harelton Oil & Gas, Inc.214 is the classic tale of buyer be-
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Id. at 68–69.
208. Id. at 70.
209. Id.
210. Id. at 71 (citing Lesley v. Veterans Bd. of Tex., 352 S.W.3d 479, 480–81 (Tex.
2011)).
211. Lesley, 352 S.W.3d at 480–81.
212. Nicholson, 534 S.W.3d at 71 (citing Lesley, 352 S.W.3d at 491).
213. Id. (citing KCM Fin. LLC v. Bradshaw, 457 S.W.3d 70, 81 (Tex. 2015)).
214. 528 S.W.3d 708 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2017, pet. denied).
344 SMU ANNUAL TEXAS SURVEY [Vol. 5
ware and provides an important reminder to practitioners to always do
their due diligence because the law will not protect us (or our clients)
from our unilateral mistakes.215 Although the fact pattern is long and in-
volved (and somewhat disputed), the fundamental essence of the case is
that Chesapeake Louisiana, L.P. paid to purchase what it thought was
100% of the working interests in the Geisler Unit. Unfortunately, al-
though the contract explicitly stated that the seller “does not represent
that it owns the rights . . . in all of the lands and leases described below,
and Chesapeake agrees that it will perform its own title due diligence
. . .”,216 Chesapeake essentially relied on the seller’s disclosures regarding
the state of title.217 At closing, the executed assignments contained the
classic “special” warranty language whereby the assignor agreed to de-
fend the title from anyone “lawfully claiming or to claim the same or any
part thereof, by through or under Assignor, but not otherwise.”218
Shortly after closing, it came to light that Chesapeake had actually only
purchased 47% of the working interests and Chesapeake sued to recover
“overpayments” under the purchase contract using the theory of unjust
enrichment.219
As a general rule, Texas courts allow recovery under unjust enrichment
and restitution theories for three fact patterns: “(1) by a defrauded party
against the party who committed the fraud, (2) by a party that made an
overpayment through mistaken accounting and (3) by a party that paid or
credited money to the wrong person or account.”220 The Texarkana Court
of Appeals did not find any of these circumstances to be applicable, and
instead found that this was a case of unilateral mistake where “the party
that must suffer the loss is the one that mistakenly created the situation
and was in the best position to have avoided it.”221 The court went on to
say that “[t]he doctrine of unjust enrichment does not operate to rescue a
party from the consequences of a bad bargain, and the enrichment of one
party at the expenses of the other is not unjust where it is permissible
under the terms of an express contract.”222 The terms of the contract in
question required Chesapeake to conduct their own due diligence, notify
the seller of any “Title Defect,” and if Chesapeake failed to notify the
seller of the “Title Defect,” the “Title Defect” was deemed to be conclu-
sively waived.223
In a similar case of buyer beware, JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. v. Orca
215. Id. at 742.
216. Id. at 720.
217. Id.
218. Id. at 721.
219. Id. at 716.
220. Id. at 742 (citing Casstevens v. Smith, 269 S.W.3d 222, 230 n.3 (Tex. App.—Texar-
kana 2008, pet. denied)).
221. Id.
222. Id. at 740 (citing First Union Nat’l Bank v. Richmont Capital Partners, L.P., 168
S.W.3d 917, 931 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2005, no pet.)).
223. Id. at 742.
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Assets G.P., L.L.C.,224 the Texas Supreme Court examined whether a
mineral lessee justifiably relied on verbal representations made by a min-
eral lessor that negated the explicit representations contained within the
lease.225 In the case at issue, JP Morgan, acting as trustee, leased acreage
to GeoSouthern Energy Corporation sometime in 2010. GeoSouthern did
not record the leases for approximately six months. In early 2011, JP
Morgan then leased some of the same acreage to Orca. When Orca noti-
fied JP Morgan of the title defect, JP Morgan immediately returned the
$3.2 million bonus payment they had received for the leases. Despite be-
ing immediately repaid, Orca sued JP Morgan claiming breach of con-
tract, fraud, and negligent misrepresentation. The trial court dismissed
the claims against JP Morgan, finding that “the unambiguous terms of the
letter of intent and the leases precluded Orca’s contract claim” and that
as “matter of law . . . Orca could not establish the justifiable-reliance
element of its fraud and negligent-misrepresentation claims.”226
The letter of intent referred to by the trial court was signed on Decem-
ber 6, 2010, and specifically stated that Orca “had caused a search to be
made of the records . . . and has preliminarily determined that the inter-
ests were owned by the trust.”227 The letter of intent and the lease also
included specific negation of warranty language that was a change from
previous transactions entered into by the parties. The language relied on
by the trial court stated as follows:
Negation of Warranty. This lease is made without warranties of any
kind, either express or implied, and without recourse against Lessor
in the event of a failure of title, not even for the return of the bonus
consideration paid for the granting of the lease or for any rental,
royalty, shut-in payment, or any other payment now or hereafter
made by Lessee to Lessor under the terms of this lease.228
The change in the language, to include the “Negation of Warranty”
clause, was a specific point of discussion between the parties during nego-
tiations, with a JP Morgan employee at one point stating that JP Morgan
was concerned by the number of lessees who were not thoroughly exam-
ining title prior to entering into a transaction.229 The letter of intent also
contained a specific clause granting Orca thirty extra calendar days to
examine title, which the parties seemed to agree was included to allow for
the due diligence required to be performed as a direct result of the inclu-
sion of the “Negation of Warranty” clause in the contract.230
The court of appeals disagreed with the trial court’s findings and rein-
stated Orca’s fraud and negligent misrepresentation claims.231 The Texas
224. 546 S.W.3d 648 (Tex. 2018).
225. Id. at 650.
226. Id. at 652.




231. Id. at 652.
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Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals on the basis that: (1) there
were numerous “red flags” regarding the title issues before the parties
signed the lease or the letter of intent; (2) Orca was sophisticated in the
oil and gas business; and (3) because there was a direct contradiction be-
tween the oral representations and the letter of intent, Orca could not
support its claim of justifiable reliance.232 In a footnote, the supreme
court went on to explain that “either red flags or direct contradiction
alone are sufficient to negate justifiable reliance as a matter of law.”233
In a contract for deed case, Ferrara v. Nutt,234 Nutt and Ferrara entered
into a “Contract for the Lease and Mandatory Purchase of Real Estate”
in May 2011.235 Pursuant to the terms of the Contract, Ferrara was to
purchase a house from Nutt after paying Nutt $3,000 in earnest money
and $847.17 over a period of approximately twelve years. The evidence at
trial showed that Ferrara spent significant time and money improving the
house.236 In November 2011, Nutt lowered the rent payments and ex-
tended the term to fifteen years.237 In order to recoup the money spent
on the improvements, Ferrara testified that he moved out of the house
and leased the house to Rodriguez for $850 per month commencing in
2012. In June 2013, Nutt sold the property to Dalu. Ferrara brought suit
to quiet title.238 The trial court awarded Ferrara damages for breach of
contract but found that Ferrara was not entitled to the protective provi-
sions of Section 5, Subchapter D of the Texas Property Code because
Ferara did not live in the house and the provisions of Section 5, Sub-
chapter D only apply to property intended to be as the purchaser’s resi-
dence.239 The First Houston Court of Appeals upheld the holding of the
trial court.
D. STATUTE OF FRAUDS
Burrus v. Reyes240 was another contract for deed case, but in this par-
ticular case the parties disputed whether the arrangement between the
parties was a lease arrangement or an oral contract for deed that fell
within the partial performance exception for the statute of frauds. The
owner of the property, Burrus, a licensed real estate agent for over forty
years, contended that she was only leasing the property to the Reyes fam-
ily.241 The facts presented at trial established that the Reyes family had
lived in a mobile home on the property for over seventeen years when
Burrus sold the property to a third party.242 During the seventeen-year
232. Id. at 660.
233. Id. at 660 n.2 (emphasis added).
234. 555 S.W.3d 227 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2018, no pet.).
235. Id. at 232.
236. Id.
237. Id. at 233.
238. Id.
239. Id. at 234.
240. 516 S.W.3d 170 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2017, pet. denied).
241. Id. at 176.
242. Id. at 177.
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period, the Reyes family made over $22,000243 in improvements to the
property, including adding a porch, several rooms, a shed, and a dog ken-
nel.244 Although the Reyes family did not move to the property in ques-
tion until 1993,245 the facts presented at trial also established that after
Burrus bought a 10.75 acre plot of land in 1988 (which included the prop-
erty in question),246 Burrus approached many of the current residents of
the various lots within the parcel and asked if they wanted to enter into
an oral arrangement to purchase the property from her by paying
monthly payments to her until they had paid for the full purchase
price.247 This type of purchase transaction is generally called a contract-
for-deed transaction and all practitioners should be aware these transac-
tions are heavily regulated by the Texas Property Code.248
On January 31, 2012, Burrus signed a purchase and sale agreement with
a third party to sell the property where the Reyes family had lived for the
last seventeen years.249 Sometime thereafter, the purchaser hired workers
to demolish some of the improvements that the Reyes family had in-
stalled.250 The Reyes family filed suit in April 2012.251 The purchaser
filed a forcible detainer action against the Reyes family and a breach of
contract action against Burrus.252 After the trial court granted a tempo-
rary injunction, the purchaser and the Reyes family entered a settlement
agreement whereby the Reyes family agreed to move in exchange for
$64,600.253 The Reyes family continued their suit against Burrus. The jury
ruled in the Reyes family’s favor, finding that Burrus and the Reyes fam-
ily had an oral agreement that fell within the partial performance excep-
tion to the statute of frauds.254 The jury also found that because Burrus
had entered into two or more executory contracts within a year, and
failed to provide the requisite annual statements required by Section
5.077(a) of the Texas Property Code, the Reyes family was entitled to
liquidated damages pursuant to Section 5.077(d)(1) of the Texas Property
Code.255 Burrus appealed on the basis that there was insufficient evi-
243. Id. at 178.
244. Id. at 178–79.
245. Id. at 177.
246. Id. at 176.
247. Id.
248. See TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 5.072(a). Note, the current edition of § 5.072(a) of
the Texas Property Code explicitly requires such executory contracts to be in writing.
249. Burrus, 516 S.W.3d at 178.




254. Id. at 180.
255. Id.; see also TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 5.077(d)(1) (“A seller who conducts two or
more transactions within a 12-month period under this section who fails to comply with
Subsection (a) is liable to the purchaser for: (1) liquidated damages in the amount of $250
a day for each day after January 31 that the seller fails to provide the purchaser with the
statement, but not to exceed the fair market value of the property.”). At trial, the Reyes
family introduced evidence that another family had entered into a similar arrangement
with Burrus in May 1994. Burrus, 516 S.W.3d at 195.
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dence to support the finding that the partial performance exception ap-
plied.256 Burrus argued that the Reyes family needed to show not just
that improvements were made to the property, but that the improve-
ments “were substantial and added materially to the value of the prop-
erty.”257 Burrus’s argument relied on the Texas Supreme Court’s holding
in McGinty v. Hennen,258 in which a homeowner sued a contractor for the
cost of repairing the contractor’s poor work that led to water leaks and
mold.259
In McGinty, the homeowner established the expenses related to the
repairs but they failed to establish that the repairs were “reasonable and
necessary.”260 The El Paso Court of Appeals distinguished McGinty from
the case at hand and found that in order to support their partial perform-
ance claim, Reyes only needed to establish that the repairs were “valua-
ble and permanent.”261 Burrus also argued that the Reyes family was not
entitled to liquidated damages required by Chapter 5 because the con-
tract was not in writing as required by Section 5.072.262 However, the
requirement that executory agreements must be in writing was added to
the Texas Property Code in 2001, well after the agreement at issue in this
case.263
In Wells v. Hoisager,264 the Wells family argued that Arabella Mineral
& Royalties breached an oral contract to purchase their surface estate.
The facts are somewhat cumbersome, but the essentials are as follows: an
employee for Arabella approached the Wells about purchasing their
property. At the time of the conversation, the Arabella employee did not
realize that Wells only owned a surface estate.265 The parties settled on a
price of $750,000, but Arabella believed all parties understood the price
was subject to due diligence and the ability to garner investor participa-
tion. Impatient with the pace of the transaction, Mr. Wells showed up at
Arabella’s office unexpectedly one day, insistent upon closing the trans-
action. Arabella and Wells signed a deed for the purchase of the mineral
estate. It later turned out that the mineral estate was not owned by the
Wells, but instead by the state of Texas. The ownership of the mineral
interest by the state of Texas presented a potential conflict of interest
which may have prevented Arabella from purchasing the surface estate.
After several months of repeatedly requesting a written agreement to
memorialize their transaction, while Arabella was simultaneously at-
tempting to work out the conflict issues with the State, Mr. Wells insisted
256. Burrus, 516 S.W.3d at 181.
257. Id. at 182.
258. 372 S.W.3d 625, 627–29 (Tex. 2012).
259. Id. at 626.
260. Id. at 629.
261. Burrus, 516 S.W.3d at 183.
262. Id. at 195.
263. Id.
264. 553 S.W.3d 515 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2018, no pet.).
265. Id. at 518.
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that his accountant needed a letter outlining the transaction so that he
could avoid capital gains taxes. Arabella provided the following letter:
On November 13, 2012, Arabella Minerals & Royalties and Mr.
Wells, came to the agreement of $750,000 for the purchase of surface
property in the E/2 of Section 180, Bock 13, H&GN RR Co. Survey,




One week later, an attorney for Wells sent Arabella a letter demanding
Arabella close on the sale, as described in the letter, or face litigation.
Arabella stopped all negotiations and Wells filed suit for breach of con-
tract. At issue in the trial were arguably two different contracts: (1) the
“oral” contract formed during the discussion; and (2) the letter from Ara-
bella outlining the price. As every first year law student learns, there are
five elements to contract creation: “(i) an offer; (ii) acceptance in strict
compliance with the terms of the offer; (iii) a meeting of the minds; (iv)
each party’s consent to the terms; and (v) execution and delivery of the
contract . . .”267 The El Paso Court of Appeals found that with respect to
both of the “contracts” (the oral agreement and the letter), there did not
appear to be a meeting of the minds.268 The only elements the parties
agreed upon was the portion of the property owned by the Wells (one
quarter) and the price ($750,000).269
E. STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
Although covered in last year’s materials, the authors are again cover-
ing the Tregallas v. Carol M. Archer Trust No. Three270 case because, as
the authors stated in last year’s review, the holding of the Amarillo Court
of Appeals was not only extremely troubling for real estate transactional
attorneys but it also created severe uncertainty for anyone who engages
in the buying and selling of real estate. Luckily for all real estate practi-
tioners, and more so for all of the participants in the real estate market,
the clearly erroneous court of appeals holding was reversed by the Texas
Supreme Court in November 2018. The case, and its many progeny, are
very long and involved, so what follows is a condensed version of the case
and the most relevant court holdings, including the reversal by the Texas
Supreme Court.
At its core, the Tregallas case concerned a right of first refusal (ROFR)
with respect to a mineral interest. In June 2003, a warranty deed trans-
266. Id. at 519.
267. Id. at 522 (citing Karns v. Jalapeno Tree Holdings, L.L.C., 459 S.W.3d 683, 692
(Tex. App.—El Paso 2015, pet. denied)).
268. Id.
269. Id.
270. 507 S.W.3d 423 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2016), rev’d, 566 S.W.3d 281 (Tex. 2018).
350 SMU ANNUAL TEXAS SURVEY [Vol. 5
ferred the surface of certain property located in Hansford, County Texas
to the Archer Trustees. In a separate recorded agreement, entered into
simultaneously, the Archer Trustees were granted a ROFR to purchase
the minerals under the surface. The ROFR specifically provided that it
was subordinate to mortgages and other encumbrances. Two of the origi-
nal grantors (the Farbers) sold their mineral interests on March 28, 2007,
to Tregallas. The Archer Trustees became aware of the sale in May 2011
and filed suit for specific performance of the ROFR on May 5, 2011. To
further complicate matters, in 2008, heirs of one of the original grantors
(the Smiths) sold their interest to Tregallas. After they learned of the
Archer Trustee suit, the Smith transaction was restructured into a loan
secured by a deed of trust with a note payable in ninety days on which the
Smiths never made payment. In August 2012, Tregallas acquired the
Smith interest at a non-judicial foreclosure sale.
Upon finding out about the foreclosure transaction, the Archer Trust-
ees amended their petition and alleged that Tregallas “obtained the Smith
minerals by subterfuge, artifice, or device.”271 The trial court granted spe-
cific performance to the Archer Trustees with respect to both the Farber
and Smith ROFR interest.272 Tregallas put forth a number of arguments
on appeal, but, for the sake of brevity, the authors will focus on the issues
most relevant to practitioners and the subject of the supreme court’s re-
cent opinion, specifically that the Archer Trustee’s claim for specific per-
formance, with respect to the Farber interest, was barred by the statute of
limitations. Generally, when a grantor of a ROFR sells property in
breach of a ROFR “there is created in the holder an enforceable option
to acquire the property according to the terms of the sale.”273
However, Section 16.004(a)(1) of the Texas Civil Practice & Remedies
Code requires “a suit for specific performance of a contract for the con-
veyance of real property to be brought no later than four years after the
cause of action accrues.”274 The court of appeals held that the breach
occurred on March 28, 2007, when the Farbers sold their property to Tre-
gallas and that the suit for specific performance was barred because it was
filed outside the four-year statute of limitations period.275 The court of
appeals based their holding on the supreme court’s holding in S.V. v.
R.V.,276 where the supreme court stated “a cause of action accrues when
a wrongful act causes some legal injury, even if the fact of injury is not
discovered until later, and even if all resulting damages have not yet
occurred.”277
271. Id. at 428.
272. Id. at 426.
273. Id. at 430 (citing A.G.E., Inc. v. Buford, 105 S.W.3d 667, 673 (Tex. App.—Austin
2003, pet. denied)).
274. Id. (citing TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 16.004(a)(1); Gilbreath v. Steed,
No. 12-11-00251-CV, (Tex. App.—Tyler 2013, no pet.) (mem. op. on mot. for reh’g)).
275. Id. at 433.
276. 933 S.W.2d 1 (Tex. 1996).
277. Id. at 4.
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The Archer Trustees tried unsuccessfully to argue that with respect to
rights of first refusal, the right is “dormant” until the holder is notified of
a potential sale. The court of appeals disagreed and said that supporting
the Archer Trustee’s argument would result in profound uncertainty that
was “inconsistent with the purpose of the statutes of limitation” which,
according to the supreme court’s holding in S.V., is to “establish a point
of repose and to terminate stale claims.”278
The Archer Trustees went on to argue for application of the discovery
rule, which tolls the accrual of a cause of action until the party learns of
the injury or, through reasonable due diligence, could have learned of the
injury. The court of appeals dismissed the Archers Trustees’ arguments
and relied on the supreme court’s holding in Cosgrove v. Cade,279 which
the supreme court argued limited application of the discovery rule to in-
juries that are “inherently undiscoverable” and not ones that are discov-
erable by the exercise of reasonable due diligence such as a search of
public records, including the county clerk’s real property records or the
tax rolls.280 Furthermore, the court of appeals emphasized that the su-
preme court has specifically held that there are only rare instances where
the discovery rule should be applied to breach of contract cases as each
party to a contract is required to protect their own interests and “diligent
contracting parties should generally discover any breach during a rela-
tively long four-year limitations period.”281
In response, the Archer Trustees argued that it is well settled in Texas
that “owners of property are under no duty [to] routinely search the deed
records for later-filed documents impugning their title.”282 The court of
appeals distinguished the case at hand because, in the court’s opinion, the
Archer Trustees did not own the mineral interest—they only owned an
option to acquire a mineral interest, which was a contract right.283 The
court of appeals reversed the trial court with respect to the Farber inter-
est and upheld the trial court with respect to the Smith interest.284
In overturning the holding of the court of appeals, the Texas Supreme
Court specifically found that:
[A] grantor’s conveyance of property in breach of a right of first re-
fusal, where the rightholder is given no notice of the grantor’s intent
to sell or the purchase offer, is inherently undiscoverable and that
the discovery rule applies to defer accrual of the holder’s cause of
action until he knew or should have known of the injury.285
Although the supreme court in a footnote specifically limited its hold-
ing to the very narrow set of circumstances found in this case by stating
278. Tregallas, 507 S.W.3d at 432.
279. 468 S.W.3d 32, 36 (Tex. 2015).
280. Tregallas, 507 S.W.3d at 433.
281. Id. at 432 (quoting Via Net v. TIG Ins. Co., 211 S.W.3d 310, 315 (Tex. 2006)).
282. Id. at 433.
283. See id.
284. Id. at 437.
285. Tregallas v. Carol M. Archer Trust No. Three, 566 S.W.3d 281, 292 (Tex. 2018).
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“[w]e limit our holding to this particular breach—conveyance with no no-
tice of the intent to sell or the existence of an offer—of this particular
type of right.”286 The holding is welcome news for real estate practition-
ers and holders of all forms of options or ROFRs in the state of Texas. As
stated clearly in last year’s review, the authors feel it is no exaggeration to
state that if the court of appeals holding had been upheld, thousands (if
not millions) of real estate deals across the state of Texas would have
been thrown into a state of uncertainty and chaos with holders of ROFRs
and options denied the benefit of their bargain and the rights they negoti-
ated for (and often times paid handsomely for) at the time the bargain
was struck. With a stroke of the pen, the court of appeals had suddenly
rendered once valuable rights worth less than the paper they were written
on.
Jarzombek v. Ramsey287 is another interesting case revolving around
the application of the discovery rule, this time with respect to a deed ref-
ormation case. In Jarzombek, the San Antonio Court of Appeals upheld
the trial court’s holding that the discovery rule did not apply to a deed
reformation case filed seven years after the date the purchase transaction
had closed.288 In this case, the Jarzombeks sold the surface estate to the
Ramseys. The Jarzombeks also owned 1/16 of royalty interest in Tract 1
and the entire mineral estate in Tract 2. The purchase contract provided
that the Jarzombeks would convey 1/2 of the mineral interest to the Ram-
seys. Unfortunately, the deed prepared by the Jarzombeks’ attorney pro-
vided for a reservation of 1/32 royalty interest. In refusing to apply the
discovery rule to the case at hand, the court of appeals, like the Amarillo
Court of Appeals in Tregallas, relied upon the Texas Supreme Court’s
holding in Cosgrove.
In Cosgrove, the Cades entered into a purchase contract stipulating
that they would retain all mineral interests. The deed they executed failed
to reserve the mineral rights. The supreme court relied upon its own hold-
ing in McClung v. Lawrence289 that held “[a]t execution, the grantor is
charged with immediate knowledge of an unambiguous deed’s material
terms.”290 The supreme court went on to say that the discovery rule is not
intended to extend the statute of limitations to correct conspicuous and
plainly evident mistakes.291
Unlike the holding in Tregallas, the authors feel that the court of ap-
peals’s holding is a correct interpretation of Cosgrove and provides the
reassurance and certainty to practitioners and holders of all real estate
rights that was intended to be given by statutes of limitation and is neces-
sary for the smooth and efficient operation of the real estate market.
Whether the holding would be extended to a material correction deed
286. Id. at 293 n.10.
287. 534 S.W.3d 534, 539 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2017, pet. denied).
288. Id.
289. 430 S.W.2d 179, 181 (Tex. 1968).
290. Jarzombek, 534 S.W.3d at 537 (citing McClung, 430 S.W.2d at 181).
291. Id. at 539.
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executed by agreement of the parties remains to be seen. It is the authors’
opinion that it would not, but rather would extend only to a disputed
error. But one should also take note of Tanya L. McCabe Trust v. Ranger
Energy LLC,292 finding that a correction instrument that makes material
corrections must be executed by all of the affected parties and comply
with the requirements of Section 5.029 of the Texas Property Code, other-
wise it is ineffective. Care should be taken under the statute to determine
if an error is material or non-material and the requirements followed.
F. SLANDER OF TITLE
In Allen-Pieroni v. Pieroni,293 the Texas Supreme Court addressed the
issue of slander of title and the appropriate way in which to calculate
damages. Legally, slander of title is a “false and malicious statement
made in disparagement of a person’s title to property which causes spe-
cial damages.”294
This particular case involved a divorced couple. In the divorce, the hus-
band was awarded the family business and the wife was awarded $500,000
to be paid monthly in $10,000 installments. Although the husband had
dutifully paid, the wife filed an abstract of judgment against the hus-
band’s home. When the husband tried to sell the house several years
later, the wife refused to release the abstract of judgment and the sale fell
through. The husband sued to quiet title and for slander of title. The
court of appeals (and the trial court) held that the difference between the
contract price for the piece of property and the mortgage balance was the
correct calculation of damages and awarded $98,438.00 plus attorney
fees.295 The supreme court disagreed with the calculation of the damages
and reversed.296 The supreme court stated that “[t]the law does not pre-
sume damages as a consequence of slander of title; rather, the plaintiff
must prove special damages.”297 What many practitioners may find sur-
prising about this case is that although the supreme court held that the
loss of a specific, pending sale qualifies for special damages, the measure
of damages was not deemed equal to the lost profit.298 Instead, the su-
preme court held that:
In a case in which the plaintiff still owns the property at the time of
trial, the amount of actual damages caused by the slander is gener-
ally the difference between the contract price (the amount the plain-
tiff would have received but for the defendant’s title disparagement)
and the property’s market value at the time of trial with the cloud
292. 531 S.W.3d 783, 784 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2016, pet. denied).
293. 535 S.W.3d 887 (Tex. 2017).
294. Id. at 887 (citing Marrs & Smith P’ship v. D.K. Boyd Oil & Gas Co., 223 S.W.3d 1,
20 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2005, pet. denied)).
295. Id. at 888.
296. Id.
297. Id. at 889 (citing Ellis v. Watson, 656 S.W.2d 902, 905 (Tex. 1983)).
298. Id.
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removed.299
In coming to this conclusion, the supreme court relied on their holding in
Reaugh v. McCollum Exploration Inc.,300 which relied upon the following
comment from the Restatement of Torts for its holding:
[T]he extent of the pecuniary loss caused by the prevention of a sale
is determined by the difference between the sales price which would
have been realized by it and the salable value of the thing in question
after there has been a sufficient time following the frustration of the
sale to permit its marketing. The depreciation of the thing from any
cause after such time has elapsed is immaterial.301
VI. TITLE/CONVEYANCES/RESTRICTIONS
A. CONVEYANCES
The Survey period also included a number of cases construing deed
language. In one case that was first reported (and questioned) during the
authors’ last update, Davis v. Mueller,302 the Texas Supreme Court re-
versed the Texarkana Court of Appeals303 to find a general grant of “all”
the property “owned by Grantor in Harrison County” was sufficient to
grant all of the property owned by the grantor in Harrison County.304 In
this case, the specific granting clause listed ten vaguely described tracts in
Harrison County, but the paragraph following the granting clause in the
deed included a Mother Hubbard clause indicating that: “Grantor hereby
conveys to grantee all of the mineral, royalty, and overriding royalty in-
terest owned by grantor in Harrison County, whether or not same are
herein above correctly described.”305
The grantee of a subsequent conveyance to two of the tracts, also in
Harrison County, brought the trespass-to-try title case to determine own-
ership of those tracts.306 The supreme court reiterated Texas law that a
general conveyance of all the grantor’s property in a geographic area will
be given effect.307 The subsequent grantee challenged the deed and
claimed it was ambiguous because the general granting clause was in the
same paragraph as a Mother Hubbard clause, and it is well established308
that a Mother Hubbard clause is not effective to convey a significant
property interest not adequately described.309 However, the supreme
299. Id. at 889 (citing Reaugh v. McCollum Expl. Inc., 163 S.W.2d 620 (Tex. 1942)).
300. 163 S.W.2d 620 (Tex. 1942).
301. Id. at 622 (quoting RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 633 cmt. D
(1933)).
302. 528 S.W.3d 97 (Tex. 2017).
303. Mueller v. Davis, 485 S.W.3d 622 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2016), rev’d sub nom.
Davis v. Mueller, 528 S.W.3d 97 (Tex. 2017).
304. Davis, 528 S.W.3d at 103.
305. Mueller, 485 S.W.3d at 629.
306. Davis, 528 S.W.3d at 100.
307. Id. at 101.
308. Id. at 102.
309. Id.
2019] Real Property 355
court found meaning in the general grant stating “[a]ll means all.”310 The
specific grant of all the property saved the earlier vague descriptions.311
Cochran Investments v. Chicago Title Insurance Company312 may have
drawn the most attention among the title cases during the Survey period,
and it continues to draw debate. The title insurer was a party via contrac-
tual subrogation after paying the loss to the buyer/insured Ayers. Ayers
had suffered a complete failure of title due to a mishandling of a bank-
ruptcy earlier in the chain of title. The eventual owner, Cochran Invest-
ments, sold the property to Ayers and delivered a Special Warranty
Deed. The Fourteenth Houston Court of Appeals found the special war-
ranty was not breached—not a surprise—but also found that there was no
implied covenant of seisin.313 In order for a covenant of seisin to be im-
plied, there must be a representation or claim of ownership by the gran-
tor.314 In this case, there was only the standard “grant, sell and convey”
language, but there was no language about having the right and authority
to sell and convey or similar language.315 The “grant, sell and convey”
language only implied a covenant that the property has not been encum-
bered or previously conveyed by the grantor.316
Moreover, the contract merged into the deed such that the breach of
contract claim for failure to deliver title did not stand.317 There is clearly
a drafting lesson in this case, both for the contract and possibly the deed,
as appropriate. As a result of poor drafting, the transaction suffered a
complete failure of consideration, but the seller/grantor kept the payment
for the property. Some commentators have noted the end result was the
same as delivering a quit claim.
The result in Cochran is supported by JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. v.
Orca Assets G.P., L.L.C.318 (discussed previously in more detail),319 in
which the Texas Supreme Court declined to imply any covenants when
the contract (an oil and gas lease) allocated risk to the lessee and warran-
ties were expressly disclaimed.320
Another drafting lesson can be found in Gonzalez v. Janssen.321 The
use of “subject to” has always been a problem for drafters and, in this
case, the San Antonio Court of Appeals looked to the entirety of the
310. Id.
311. Id.
312. 550 S.W.3d 196 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2018, pet. denied).
313. Id. at 205.
314. Id.
315. Id.
316. Id. at 204 (citing Lykken v. Kindsvater, No. 02-13-00214-CV, 2014 WL 5771832
(Tex. App.—Fort Worth Nov. 6, 2014) (mem. op.); Maness v. Purnell Morrow Co., No. 05-
98-01828-CV, 2001 WL 637818, at *1 (Tex. App.—Dallas June 11, 2001, no pet.) (mem. op.,
not designated for publication); Fender v. Farr, 262 S.W.2d 539, 540 (Tex. Civ. App.—
Texarkana 1953, no writ)).
317. Id. at 205–06.
318. 546 S.W.3d 648 (Tex. 2018) (mot. for reh’g denied).
319. See infra Section V.C.
320. See Orca, 546 S.W.3d at 655.
321. 553 S.W.3d 633 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2018, pet. filed).
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deed—the “four corners”—to interpret its meaning.322 This has clearly
become the rule for the courts, with the area of oil and gas seemingly
being the last vestige of strict construction. In Gonzalez, a series of deeds
conveyed property with a legal description but “subject to” prior
deeds.323 Each deed conveyed “all of the following described real prop-
erty.”324 In this case, the “subject to” language was not tied to the grant
but rather was found to simply follow the property description.325 Con-
sidering the deeds as a whole, the court of appeals held that “the ‘subject
to’ clause did not exclude anything from the conveyances, but instead
merely refer to encumbrances on the properties and explain and clarify
the nature of the title being conveyed.”326 Thus, no interests were with-
held but rather passed to the grantee.327
The Texas Supreme Court heard yet another mineral deed interpreta-
tion case with Perryman v. Spartan Texas Six Capital,328 and its holding
will be of interest to many real estate practitioners because it focused on
a rarely discussed distinction between a deed reservation and an excep-
tion.329 The supreme court held that the same identical language when
used in the first deed in a chain of title was a reservation and in successive
deeds was an exception.330
As the supreme court stated in its opening paragraph, the issue at hand
in Perryman was the meaning of a clause in a deed that “saves and ex-
cepts 1/2 of all royalties from the production of oil, gas and/or other min-
erals that may be produced from the above described premises which are
now owned by Grantor,” when the deed does not disclose that the gran-
tor does not own all of the royalty interests and does not except any other
royalty interests from the conveyance.331 This same language was used in
three of the seven subsequent deeds, thereby creating a domino effect
where one could argue that the subsequent grantor was granting more
than they owned. The supreme court disagreed with the interpretation of
the deeds by both the trial court and the appeals court.332
Although complex, the facts can be adequately summarized as follows.
The grantor under the first deed, Ben Perryman, at the time of the deed
(which the court referred to as “Ben’s Deed”) owned the entire surface
and mineral estate. All parties to the case agreed, and the supreme court
concurred, that after Ben’s Deed, Ben retained 1/2 of the mineral royal-
ties and the grantees, Gary and Nancy, owned 1/2 the mineral royalty and
the entire surface estate. Ben died intestate in 1980 and the mineral inter-
322. Id. at 637.
323. Id. at 635–36.
324. Id.
325. Id. at 640.
326. Id. at 642.
327. Id.
328. 546 S.W.3d 110 (Tex. 2018).
329. Id. at 119.
330. Id. at 124.
331. Id. at 113.
332. Id.
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est passed, 1/2 to his brother Gary and 1/2 to Wade, which left Gary and
Nancy with 3/4 of the mineral interests. In 1983, Gary and Nancy then re-
conveyed the tract of land they received from Ben to GNP using the same
language from Ben’s Deed. The deed did not mention that Wade’s heir,
Leasha, owned 1/4 of the royalty interest. That interest was not excepted
from the grant. GNP granted a deed of trust to Gainesville National Bank
(Bank) using the same language. GNP defaulted and the Trustee’s deed
to the successful lender on a credit bid referred to the premises “now
owned by Gary Perryman.”333 The Bank conveyed the property to
Menser (and her to be divorced husband) without the “save and except”
language but with language excluding recorded instruments from the con-
veyance and warranty.334 When Menser conveyed the property to John-
son, she reserved to herself 1/2 of the minerals. She also made her
conveyance subject to any prior valid mineral severance. Johnson con-
veyed a majority of the property to Spartan and excepted recorded in-
struments. Spartan and Menser entered into a lease with EOG and a
subsequent lease dispute brought the title issues to light.
The supreme court declined to use a Duhig analysis and did not find a
breach of warranty because a party might have sought to retain more
than it had to reserve and convey.335 In this case, the deeds “excepted” 1/
2 of the royalty interests “which are now owned by grantor.”336 The “less,
save and except” clause created an exception from the grant, not a reser-
vation for the grantor.337 The supreme court found no language creating a
reservation.338 “The most reasonable grammatical construction of this
deed is the clause excepts 1/2 of all royalties from the minerals produced
from the “premises which are now owned by Grantor . . .[a]nd since each
of the grantors owned all of the premises in each deed, the clause ex-
cepted 1/2 of all the royalties produced from those premises.”339
In addition, the “now owned by Grantor phrase” was part of the “save
and except” and not the interest being conveyed.340 The clause at issue
described the interest excepted and not the interest conveyed.341 As a
result, the deeds conveyed 1/2 and excepted 1/2 of the royalty interests—
not just 1/2 of the royalty interest the grantors then owned.342 Ultimately,
the parties—Menser, Leasha, Gary and Nancy, and Spartan—held a 1/4
interest in the royalties.343
In BNSF Railway Company v. Chevron Midcontinent, L.P.,344 the El
333. Id. at 114.
334. Id. at 115.
335. Id. at 120.
336. Id.
337. Id. at 115.
338. Id. at 121.
339. Id. at 121 (citing In re C.J.N.-S., 540 S.W.3d. 589 (Tex. 2018)).
340. Id. at 123.
341. Id.
342. Id. at 124.
343. Id. at 133.
344. 528 S.W.3d 124 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2017, no pet.).
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Paso Court of Appeals used a similar approach to the Mueller court in
determining whether a grant of a right of way was an easement or fee
simple. The court of appeals specifically used a “Four Corners Rule” to
determine the intent of the parties rather than using “arbitrary” construc-
tion rules.345 The court made an effort to interpret the deeds so that no
clause was rendered meaningless and found that the use of the phrase
“right of way” did not automatically convey an easement or a fee sim-
ple.346 In the BNSF case, the determining feature was the description of
the property which referenced a line traced by surveyors that went over,
though, and across various sections of land.347 Moreover, the language of
the grant suggested that the conveyance was intended to be an ease-
ment.348 The court found the following factors to be persuasive: (1) the
opening recitals of the deed recognized that the grantor would receive
valuable benefits if the railroad passed over the land he was conveying;
(2) the phrase for a “right of way” appeared directly in the granting
clause in front of the phrase “that strip of land” (this was a defining
phrase limiting the estate being granted); (3) the conveyance was de-
scribed by reference to a line traced by a surveyor over, though, and
across the land; (4) the deed specified that the conveyance came with the
rights to take wood, water, stone, timber and other materials used for
convenience in the construction and maintenance of the railway (if the
grant was a fee simple estate these would not need to be specified as they
are inherently the right of the property owner); and (5) the court found
that the use of the term “premises” suggested that conveyance trans-
ferred only an easement.349 Interestingly enough, the term “fee simple”
was used in the habendum clause, but the court found that not to be
determinative.350
In Knopf v. Gray,351 the Texas Supreme Court examined a will to de-
termine if it contained a bequest of a life estate or fee simple. Both the
trial court and Waco Court of Appeals found that the words in the will
that “the land is not to be sold” were an invalid disabling restraint on sale
and that the will, therefore, bequeathed a fee simple estate.352 The su-
preme court reversed.353 The will provision in question stated in part as
follows: “NOW BOBBY I leave the rest to you, everything, certificates of
deposit, land, cattle and machinery. Understand the land is not to be sold
but passed on down to your children, ANNETTE KNOPF, ALLISON
KILWAY, AND STANLEY GRAY. TAKE CARE OF IT AND TRY
345. Id. at 128 (citing Clayton Williams Energy, Inc. v. BMT O & G TX, L.P., 473
S.W.3d 341, 348 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2015, pet. denied)).
346. Id. at 130.
347. Id.
348. Id. at 133.
349. Id. at 133–34.
350. Id. at 135.
351. 545 S.W.3d 542 (Tex. 2018).
352. Id. at 544–45.
353. Id. at 547.
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TO BE HAPPY.”354
Section 5.001(a) of the Texas Property Code provides that “[a]n estate
in land that is conveyed or devised is a fee simple unless the estate is
limited by express words.”355 However, Texas jurisprudence does not re-
quire the use of any specific words to create a life estate, only the intent
of the party that such an estate be created.356 The supreme court felt that
it was clearly the intent of the grantor that a life estate be created and
reversed the holding of the lower courts.357
The Houston Court of Appeals used the guidance from the Texas Su-
preme Court in Knopf in its analysis of the issues presented by Gutierrez
v. Stewart Title Co.358 Gutierrez involved the interpretation of a clause in
a will which stated that:
[n]one of the real property is to be sold or mortgaged, all property is
to be kept in the Gutierrez family. When one of my children dies,
that individual’s property is to be divided equally among the survi-
vors. When the last of my children is the only one remaining, then
the property can be sold or do whatever that individual desires, with-
out restrictions.359
The decedent had five living children and the will also bequeathed two
separate properties (the Church Street Property and the Winnie Street
Property) to two specific children in equal shares. The will was probated
in 1999. In 2000, the recipients of the Church Street and Winnie Proper-
ties sold the properties. In 2015, one of the remaining children, Olga,
sued the purchasers of the property and the title company alleging that
the sales were void because they violated the will. The title company ar-
gued that the claims were barred because Olga lacked standing and by
the statute of limitation. Although the case was ultimately found to be
barred because of the statute of limitations, the Houston Court of Ap-
peals relied upon Knopf to hold that Olga did have standing in the case,
as Angel and Esteban were only granted life estates pursuant to the
will.360 The title company wrongly argued that Angel and Esteban were
granted fee simple estates and the limitation in the will was void as a
“disabling restraint on sale.”361 The court of appeals held that such an
interpretation would require one to not give effect to all of the words
contained in the will which is a cornerstone of will construction.362
Having decided it was a life estate, the court noted that a “life tenant
must protect a remaindermen’s interest and preserve the estate and is
therefore prohibited from disposing of the property, unless expressly au-
354. Id. at 545–46.
355. Id. at 545 (citing TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 5.001(a)).
356. Id.
357. Id. at 547.
358. 550 S.W.3d 304 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2018, pet. denied).
359. Id. at 308.
360. Id. at 315.
361. Id. at 316.
362. Id.
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thorized by the will.”363 Unfortunately, although the court ruled in favor
of Olga on the standing issues, she discovered the sale in January 2013
and did not file the case until March 2015. Although the court did not say
the discovery rule definitively applied in this case, if it had been applied,
the latest date Olga could file her case was January 2015.364
B. TRESPASS-TO-TRY-TITLE
ConocoPhillips Co. v. Ramirez365 is a somewhat complicated case in-
volving a long history of transactions which ultimately are not relative to
the holding. A simplified version of the fact pattern is that going back to
the early 1900s, the Ramirez family owned an undivided (mineral and
surface) fee simple title to approximately 7,016 acres in Zapata County,
Texas.366 Somewhere around 1941, Leon Juan Ramirez and his sister in-
herited an undivided 1/2 interest in the minerals and surface of the ranch.
Over the years, the family engaged in a series of swaps and partitions of
the surface estate, all the while intentionally reserving their mineral inter-
ests from all transactions. When Leon Juan died in 1966, he passed 1/2 of
his 1/2 interest in the minerals and the surface estate tracts to his wife,
Leonor, and the other 1/2 to his three children (the Older Generation).367
When Leonor died in 1990, she passed to her son Leon Oscar, Sr., “all my
right, title and interest in and to Ranch ‘Las Piedras’ . . . during the term
of his natural life” and after his death “the title shall vest in his children
[(the Grandchildren)] then living in equal shares.”368 The remainder of
Leonor’s estate passed to the Older Generation.369
Over the years, the family had continued to carve up the surface estate
(while always reserving the mineral interests) and had names for all of
the various parcels. It is undisputed what land was meant by “Ranch Las
Piedras.” What was disputed is whether that land included the mineral
estate as well as the surface estate. In 1993 and 1997, three oil and gases
leases were signed between the Older Generation and ConocoPhillips.370
Leon Oscar, Sr. died in 2006.371 In 2010, the Grandchildren filed a tres-
pass-to-try-title case claiming that the ConocoPhillips leases were not
binding on their 1/4 mineral interests because they had not signed the
leases as remaindermen.372 The trial court found in the Grandchildren’s
favor and invalidated the leases as to each grandchild’s 1/12 interest in
the mineral interests and awarded attorney fees.373 ConocoPhillips ap-
363. Id. at 317 (citing Knopf v. Gray, 545 S.W.3d 542, 546, (Tex. 2018); Hill v. Hill, 623
S.W.2d 779, 780 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 1981, writ ref’d n.r.e.)).
364. Id. at 318.
365. 534 S.W.3d 490 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2017, pet. filed).
366. Id. at 496.
367. Id. at 497.
368. Id.
369. Id.
370. Id. at 498.
371. Id. at 497.
372. Id. at 498.
373. Id.
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pealed and presented many different arguments to defeat the grandchil-
dren’s claim. The four arguments of most interest to the real estate
practitioner are: (1) this was not a trespass-to-try-title case but instead a
will construction case; (2) the will was ambiguous; (3) the case was lim-
ited by the statute of limitations; and (4) the award of attorney fees was
improper.
The San Antonio Court of Appeals held that the case was in fact a title
dispute which involves the interpretation of a will as well as other docu-
ments and that trespass-to-try-title was the appropriate method to “clear
problems in chains of title.”374 Furthermore, the court found that the lan-
guage used in the will clearly conveyed all of the “right, title and interest”
to the ranch to the Grandchildren and the law has always held, “absent
an express reservation conveyance of land includes both the surface and
the underlying minerals.”375 The court of appeals went on to state
“[e]xtrinsic evidence may not be used to create doubt as to the meaning
. . . when the words used in the [w]ill are unambiguous.”376
With respect to the statute of limitations, the court held that the statute
did not start to run when Leonor died in 1990 and bequeathed the inter-
est to the Grandchildren, but in 2006, when their rights vested upon Leon
senior’s death.377 There is a well-established line of authority in Texas
that “[t]he statutes of limitation as to an interest in land, which one owns
as a remainderman, subject to the life estate in another, do not begin to
run in favor of one in possession until the death of the life tenant.”378
Finally, the court acknowledged that although as a general rule, attorney
fees are not available for trespass-to-try-title case, in this particular case,
the Grandchildren also brought a claim to recover the unpaid portion of
oil and gas proceeds, and attorney fees are recoverable under Section
91.406 of the Texas Natural Resources Code.379
In Roberson v. Odom,380 the Texarkana Court of Appeals provided the
practitioner with an important reminder on the difference between a suit
to quiet title and an action for trespass-to-try-title. A suit to quiet title is
an equitable proceeding to remove a “cloud” against title which focuses
on the weakness of defendant’s claim and requires three elements: “(1)
the plaintiff has an interest in a specific property; (2) title to the property
is affected by the defendant’s claim; and (3) the defendant’s claim, al-
though facially valid, is invalid or unenforceable.”381 A trespass-to-try-
374. Id. at 499 (quoting Martin v. Anerman, 133 S.W.3d 262, 265 (Tex. 2004)).
375. Id. at 502 (citing Sharp v. Fowler, 252 S.W.2d 153, 154 (1952)).
376. Id. (citing Longora v. Lasater, 292 S.W.3d 156, 165 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2009,
pet. denied)).
377. Id. at 505.
378. Id. (citing Estate of McWorter v. Wooten, 622 S.W.2d 844, 846 (Tex. 1981); Garza
v. Cavazos, 221 S.W.2d 549, 553 (Tex. 1949); Evans v. Graves, 166 S.W.2d 955, 958 (Tex.
Civ. App.—Dallas 1942, writ ref’d w.o.m.)).
379. Id. at 512–13 (citing Prize Energy Resources, L.P. v. Clif Hoskins, Inc., 345 S.W.3d
537, 570–71 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2011, no pet.)).
380. 529 S.W.3d 498 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2017, no pet.).
381. Id. at 502.
362 SMU ANNUAL TEXAS SURVEY [Vol. 5
title claim is a statutory remedy that focuses on the strength of the plain-
tiff’s claim to possession not the weakness of the defendant’s.382 To pre-
vail, a plaintiff must show one of four sources of title “(1) a regular chain
of conveyance form the sovereign, (2) a superior title out of common
source, (3) title by limitations or (4) prior possession, which possession
has not been abandoned.”383
Lance v. Robinson384 is a complex case that deals with who owns the
property between the dam spillway and the high water mark on Medina
Lake. This case is of particular interest to the real estate practitioner be-
cause the Texas Supreme Court addressed for the first time in some detail
the difference between a trespass-to-try-title claim, a quiet-title claim,
and a declaratory-judgment claim, and which vehicle is appropriate for a
particular circumstance. Citing various appellate decisions, the supreme
court explained that “a suit to ‘quiet title’ and a ‘trespass-to-try-title
claim’ are both to recover possession of land unlawfully withheld, though
a quiet-title suit is an equitable remedy whereas a trespass-to-try-title suit
is a legal remedy afforded by statute.”385 For this reason, a person cannot
use the trespass-to-try-title statute to establish an easement because they
do not have a possessory right.386 The supreme court held that because
the plaintiffs in the case, the Robinsons, were not claiming “any owner-
ship or possessory rights to the disputed area, and are instead seeking
only to protect their alleged easement” a suit under the Declaratory Judg-
ment Act was the appropriate procedure to deploy.387
In Bush v. Lone Oak Club, LLC,388 the issue at stake involved a some-
what obscure 1929 law commonly known as the “Small Bill” which
granted rights to patentees to “all of the lands and minerals therein con-
tained, lying across, or partly across watercourses or navigable
streams”389 and whether the “watercourses” in question included tidal
watercourses.390 Generally, in the State of Texas, water is classified as
either (1) diffuse surface water which belongs to the land owner; or (2)
water in a watercourse which is the property of the State.391 In 1837, the
State enacted a statute (since repealed) which prevented land surveys
from crossing navigable streams. In effect, the statute deprived landown-
ers who had purchased property from the State before the law was en-
acted of the land they had purchased.392 In order to cure the title defect
this law created, the State passed the Small Bill, returning to the land-
382. Id.
383. Id. (citing Kennedy Con, Inc. v. Forman, 316 S.W.3d 129, 135 (Tex. App.—Hous-
ton [14th Dist.] 2010, no pet.)).
384. 543 S.W.3d 723 (Tex. 2017).
385. Id. at 738–39 (quoting Cameron Cty. v. Tompkins, 422 S.W.3d 789, 797 (Tex.
App.—Corpus Christi 2013, pet. denied)).
386. Id. at 736 (citing City of Mission v. Popplewell, 294 S.W.2d 712, 714 (Tex. 1956)).
387. Id. at 734.
388. 546 S.W.3d 766 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2018, pet. filed).
389. Id. at 777 (citing TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5414a).
390. Id. at 777–78.
391. Id. at 778.
392. Id.
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owners the land they had already purchased.393
In the Bush case, the Lone Oak Club was trying to prevent duck
hunters from building duck blinds along the bed of the Lone Oak Bayou,
which the Lone Oak Club had acquired in a regular chain of conveyance
from an 1872 grant by the State. The Texas Land Commission took the
position that the Small Bill only applied to non-tidal bodies of water and
that the State owned the Lone Oak Bayou up to the mean high tide mark.
Therefore, that portion was open to public use. The club filed a trespass-
to-try-title case against the Land Commissioner. The court sided with the
Lone Oak Club by finding that the term “watercourse or navigable
stream” did not exclude watercourse or navigable streams that are “tid-
ally affected.”394
C. RESTRICTIONS
In Tarr v. Timberwood Park Owners Association,395 the San Antonio
Court of Appeals interpreted the “residential” restrictions contained in
restrictive covenants which arguably prohibited short-term rentals of
homes. In Tarr, a homeowner entered into thirty-one short term rental
arrangements which totaled 102 days over five months.396 The deed re-
strictions for the Timberwood Park Owners Association (the HOA) pro-
vided that homes should be “used solely for residential purposes.”397 The
HOA notified Tarr that renting out his home was a commercial use and a
violation of the deed restrictions.398 Tarr filed a declaratory judgment ac-
tion seeking a declaration that leasing the house was a residential purpose
and there was no “durational” requirement in the deed restrictions.399
Tarr and the HOA both filed motions for summary judgment and the trial
court granted the HOA’s motion.400
On appeal, Tarr argued the following: (1) the HOA allows rentals and
does not require that a homeowner personally occupy his home; and (2)
the individuals that Tarr rented to were using the house for residential
purposes.401 Relying on the court of appeal’s opinion in Munson v.
Milton,402 the HOA argued that short-term renters were not residents but
“transients.”403 The court of appeals agreed with the HOA.404 Although
the appeals court noted that “[c]ovenants restricting the free use of land
393. Id.
394. Id. at 779.
395. 510 S.W.3d 725 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2016), rev’d and remanded, 556 S.W.3d
274 (Tex. 2018).
396. Id. at 727.
397. Id. at 729.
398. Id. at 728.
399. Id.
400. Id.
401. Id. at 729.
402. Id. (citing Munson v. Milton, 948 S.W.2d 813 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1997, writ
denied)).
403. Id. (citing Munson, 948 S.W.2d at 817).
404. Id. at 730.
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are not favored by the courts, [they] will be enforced if they are clearly
worded and confined to a lawful purpose.”405 Furthermore, Section
202.003(a) of the Texas Property Code requires that “a restrictive cove-
nant be liberally construed to give effect to its purposes and intent.”406 In
this case, the court of appeals found the restrictive covenant to be unam-
biguous.407 The court went on to note that, as stated by the Munson
court, the “Texas Property Code draws a distinction between a perma-
nent residence and transient housing, which includes rooms at hotels, mo-
tels, inns and the like.”408 The court also agreed with the Munson court
that the term “‘residence’ generally requires both physical presence and
an intention to remain.”409
The Texas Supreme Court strongly disagreed with the court of appeals
and clearly stated that the lower courts’ obsession with Section 202.003(a)
of the Texas Property Code was misplaced.410 In its eyes, the issue was
not one of “strict” construction or “liberal” construction of the covenants;
instead, the covenant at issue simply did not address the use contem-
plated by the case at hand and it was improper to read into the restrictive
covenant a prohibition not directly addressed in the express language.411
The distinction came down to this: the lower courts held that Tarr had
leased to groups consisting of “multiple” families at one time, thereby
violating the “single-family” residence restrictions.412 The supreme court
held that the restriction referred to the type of housing that could be
constructed rather than the composition of the family or individuals that
could inhabit the home.413
With respect to the second argument put forth by the association, that
“residential” use did not include transient use, the supreme court noted
that the HOA was once again focused on the wrong language.414 The
covenant stated that “no business shall be conducted on any of the tracts
which is noxious or harmful,” thereby focusing on what is happening on
the property rather than how the owner is using the property.415 Further-
more, the supreme court directly addressed their disapproval of findings
of other courts in similar cases that “impose an intent or physical-pres-
ence requirement when the covenant’s language includes no such specifi-
cation and remains otherwise silent as to durational requirements.”416
With these words, the supreme court firmly settled what had been a split
between the San Antonio, Austin, and Fort Worth Courts of Appeals
405. Id. at 728.
406. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 202.003.
407. Tarr, 510 S.W.3d at 731.
408. Id. at 730 (quoting Munson, 948 S.W.2d at 817).
409. Id. (quoting Munson, 948 S.W.2d at 816).
410. Tarr v. Timberwood Park Owner’s Ass’n, 556 S.W.3d 274, 284–85 (Tex. 2018).
411. Id. at 285.
412. Id.
413. Id. at 287.
414. Id. at 288–89.
415. Id. at 289.
416. Id. at 291.
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with respect to the interpretation of restrictive covenants that limit use of
homes to “residential” purposes and whether renting such homes out on
a nightly basis violates those restrictive covenants. For practitioners, the
message is clear: if you intend to prohibit residents from utilizing their
homes for temporary rentals, the restrictions must expressly state the
intent.
EWB-I, LLC v. Plazamericas Mall Texas417 presents an interesting and
instructive case study on restrictive covenants that no longer serve their
original purpose. In Plazamericas, the plaintiff owned five parking lots
surrounding the outskirts of a mall. The lots were subject to restrictive
covenants that limit their use to uses that benefit the mall. The plaintiff
claimed the lots are under-utilized and filed a declaratory judgment suit
seeking to have the restrictive covenants declared unenforceable under
the changed conditions or waiver doctrines.418 The trial court granted
summary judgment for the mall owners and the First Houston Court of
Appeals reversed and remanded.419
The history of the dispute arose from the fact that one entity never
owned the entirety of the mall when it was originally developed. Every
owner owned at least one building and some parking lots. In 1979, all of
the owners entered into a Restated Operating Agreement (ROA) that
contained restrictive covenants binding on all parties until 2035 or earlier
written agreement of the parties. The ROA required that the parking
area contain five parking spaces for each 100 square foot of floor area
(regardless of the use of that area). Owners were prohibited from placing
any restrictions or permanent improvements in the parking area. In 2004,
ownership of some of the parking was transferred to an entity that did not
own any portion of the mall. The lots were then used as collateral for a
loan and, after the borrower defaulted, were foreclosed on by the lender.
Over the years, the mall declined and all of the anchor stores closed. The
mall turned into an indoor flea market. One structure owner closed the
major parking garage. The plaintiff began to allow traveling carnivals to
use the parking lots. Several other components of the ROA were also no
longer enforced.
The court of appeals first examined the plaintiff’s contention that the
changed conditions at the mall made the restrictive covenants incapable
of achieving their purpose. Over the years, Texas courts have accepted
the idea that changed conditions can support the nullification of a cove-
nant. However, they have insisted that the changed conditions must be
417. 527 S.W.3d 447 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2017, pet. denied).
418. Id. at 455.
419. Id. at 451.
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“radical” not “minor”420 and must consider the balance of all equities.421
The court laid out six requirements to be considered when examining the
lifting of a restrictive covenant: “(1) the size of the restricted area; (2) its
location with respect to where the change has occurred; (3) the type of
change that has taken place; (4) the character and conduct of the parties
or their predecessors in title; (5) the purpose for which the restrictions
were imposed; and (6) to some extent the unexpired term of the restric-
tions.”422 The court of appeals held that the trial court’s grant of sum-
mary judgment was inappropriate because the standard laid out above
required an intensive fact analysis of each factor423 and the evidence on
record was not sufficient to support a grant of summary judgment.
Figure 1
D. PRIVATE TRANSFER FEE OBLIGATIONS
The Attorney General of Texas, Ken Paxton, issued an opinion on
April 23, 2018, regarding the limitations imposed on private transfer fee
obligations pursuant to Section 5.201 of the Texas Property Code. A “pri-
vate transfer fee” is defined by the Texas Property Code as “an amount of
money, regardless of the method of determining the amount that is paya-
ble on the transfer of an interest in real property or payable for a right to
make or accept a transfer.”424 The legislation was effective on September
1, 2011, and made any transfer fee obligation created after the effective
420. Id. (citing Simon v. Henrichson, 394 S.W.2d 249, 254 (Tex. Civ. App.—Corpus
Christi 1965, writ ref’d n.r.e.)); see also Lebo v. Johnson, 349 S.W.2d 744, 749–50 (Tex. Civ.
App.—San Antonio 1961, writ ref’d n.r.e.); Hemphill v. Cayce, 197 S.W.2d 137, 141 (Tex.
Civ. App.—Fort Worth 1946, no writ).
421. Plazamericas, 527 S.W.3d at 451 (citing Gunnels v. N. Woodland Hills Cmty.
Ass’n, 563 S.W.2d 334, 338 (Tex. Civ. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1978, no writ)).
422. Id. (citing Simon, 394 S.W.2d at 254) (internal quotations omitted)).
423. Id. at 460.
424. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 5.201.
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date of the legislation void and unenforceable.425 To the extent a private
transfer fee obligation was in existence prior to the legislation, the recipi-
ent of the fee was required to file a “Notice of Private Transfer Fee Obli-
gation” (complying with the requirements provided in the legislation) in
the real property records on or before January 31, 2012, and at certain
regular intervals.426 The legislation also requires a seller of property to
provide notice to the purchaser of the private transfer fee obligation.427
The attorney general issued the following opinions with respect to the
legislation:
1. Failure to strictly comply with the notice requirement in all re-
spects voids the private transfer fee obligation.428
2. Although failure to provide notice to a purchaser does not void
the obligation, the purchaser may attempt to void the
transaction.429
E. CORRECTION INSTRUMENTS
Tanya L. McCabe Trust v. Ranger Energy430 construed the relatively
new “correction instruments” statutes.431 The issue addressed in this case
was whether the addition of new property in a corrected deed of trust
constituted a non-material or material correction. Because the facts are
complex, the following is a liberal summary. In 2011, the Trust obtained a
conveyance of overriding royalty interests of various percentages in vari-
ous different assignments, some excluding and some including the dis-
puted McShane Fee and Bruce Lease. However, a correction instrument
in December 2011 included these disputed tracts. The prior owner, Mark
III, obtained six of the eight overriding royalty interests (inadvertently
omitting the McShane and Brice tracts) from Tomco in 2008. Mark III
obtained a mortgage in late 2008 from Peoples Bank that covered only
the six properties (also omitting the McShane and Brice tracts). Ulti-
mately, when these errors were discovered, Tomco and Mark III executed
a correction assignment in December 2011, which was after the convey-
ances to the Trust. Mark III defaulted on the Peoples Bank loan and en-
tered into a 2012 settlement agreement and a renewal deed of trust
containing only the six properties, omitting McShane and Brice. How-
ever, the error was eventually discovered by Peoples Bank and a cor-
rected deed of trust (including the McShane and Brice tracts) was
unilaterally filed by Peoples Bank in January 2013. Thereafter, Mark III
defaulted and Peoples Bank foreclosed under its corrected deed of trust
claiming that such foreclosure wiped out the Trust’s overriding royalty
interests. The Trust objected and brought suit.
425. Id. § 5.202.
426. Id. § 5.203.
427. Id. § 5.205.
428. Ken Paxton, Opinion No. KP-0195 3 (2018).
429. Id. at 4.
430. 531 S.W.3d 783 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2016, pet. denied).
431. See generally TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. §§ 5.027–5.030.
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At issue was the effect of the various correction instruments on the
state of title concerning the interests of the Trust. The correction instru-
ment statute divides correction instruments into those dealing with non-
material corrections432 and material corrections.433 A non-material cor-
rection includes the correction of “a legal description prepared in connec-
tion with the preparation of the original instrument but inadvertently
omitted from the original instrument.”434 The majority of the court con-
cluded the corrected deed of trust was a material correction because it
“add[ed] . . . land to a conveyance that correctly conveys other land.”435
As to a material correction, the statute required the corrected instrument
to have been executed by each party. In the subject case, Peoples Bank
had independently made the correction, filed it, and provided a copy and
notice to the debtor. Therefore, the Trust alleged the correction instru-
ment was invalid and not effective because it did not comply with the
statutory requirement for execution of a material correction. The First
Houston Court of Appeals agreed and found the correction instrument
invalid.436
Further, the correction instrument statute provided that the correction
instrument replaces and is a substitute of the original instrument and may
be relied upon by a bona fide purchaser, but the correction instrument is
subject to the interests of an intervening creditor or subsequent purchaser
for valuable consideration without notice acquired after the date of the
original instrument but prior to the date of the correction instrument.437
Because the court determined that the correction instrument was invalid,
the correction instrument did not constitute “notice to a subsequent
buyer.”438 Consequently, the interest of the Trust (in the McShane and
Brice tracts) was not extinguished by the Peoples Bank foreclosure.439
In a factually intense case, Heredia v. Zimprich,440 which was more
about fraud than conveyance deeds, the El Paso Court of Appeals
demonstrated how a boundary dispute could be facilitated by a misuse of
Subdivision Plats and correction deeds.441 Signing off on both the deeds
and plats without understanding their purpose ultimately facilitated
changes in a boundary line. The party who executed the documents was
essentially estopped from arguing about their validity.442 A dissenting
opinion argued otherwise, also noting that a plat is not an instrument of
conveyance.443
432. Id. § 5.028.
433. Id. § 5.029.
434. Id. § 5.028(a-1)(1).
435. Ranger Energy, 531 S.W.3d at 797 (citing TEX. PROP. CODE ANN.
§ 5.029(a)(1)(C)).
436. Id. at 798.
437. See generally TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 5.030(b), (c).
438. Ranger Energy, 531 S.W.3d at 798.
439. Id. at 799.
440. 559 S.W.3d 223 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2018, no pet.).
441. Id. at 225.
442. Id. at 231–32.
443. Id. at 242.
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F. ADVERSE POSSESSION
Two cases during the Survey period addressed adverse possession. In
Hardway v. Nixon,444 the Korth heirs asserted they acquired 147.5 min-
eral acres in Karnes County from their mineral co-tenants through con-
structive ouster and adverse possession.445 The trial court agreed and
granted the Korth heirs’ motion for summary judgment. The San Antonio
Court of Appeals found the trial court erred in granting summary judg-
ment because the Korth heirs had not established constructive ouster as a
matter of law and reversed the trial court’s holding.446 The case is a good
reminder to practitioners of the much higher standards applicable to ad-
verse possession by a co-tenant.
The court of appeals began by outlining the standard elements of an
adverse possession claim: “(1) actual possession of the dispute property,
(2) that it is open and notorious, (3) peaceable, (4) under a claim of right,
(5) that it is consistently and continuously adverse or hostile to the claim
of another person for the duration of the relevant statutory period.”447
The court then went on to examine the higher burden of proof required
for co-tenants, because the fundamental element of co-tenancy is that
each party has the right to fully occupy and use the property so one must
prove not only “his possession was adverse, but must also prove some
sort of ouster—actual or constructive.”448 Relying on the Texas Supreme
Court’s holding in Tex-Wis Co. v. Johnson,449 the court of appeals out-
lined the elements of ouster: “(1) long-continued possession under a
claim of ownership[;] and (2) non-assertion of claim by the title-
holder.”450 Although arguably the Korth heirs presented some evidence
of these points, the court concluded that such a finding required the
finder of fact to draw an inference that was inappropriate for a summary
judgment motion.451
In Brown v. Snider Industries, LLP,452 the requirement of “hostility”
arose. Of particular interest, the Texarkana Court of Appeals appeared to
be persuaded that an offer to purchase the property interrupted the ad-
verse possession.453 The court held the same to be an admission of title
and contrary to a “repudiation” of title.454 The court also found that an
444. 544 S.W.3d 402 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2017, pet. denied).
445. Id. at 404–05.
446. Id. at 412.
447. Id. at 409 (citing Estrada v. Cheshire, 470 S.W.3d 109, 123 (Tex. App.—Houston
[1st Dist.] 2015, pet. denied); Glover v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 187 S.W.3d 201, 213 (Tex.
App.—Texarkana 2006, pet. denied); Villarreal v. Guerra, 446 S.W.3d 404, 410 (Tex.
App.—San Antonio 2014, pet. denied)).
448. Id. (citing BP Am. Prod. Co. v. Marshall, 342 S.W.3d 59, 70 (Tex. 2011) (quoting
Todd v. Bruner, 365 S.W.2d 155, 160 (Tex. 1963))).
449. 534 S.W.2d 895 (Tex. 1976).
450. Hardaway, 544 S.W.3d at 409 (citing Tex-Wis Co., 534 S.W.2d at 901; Rife v. Kerr,
513 S.W.3d 601, 617 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2011, pet. denied)).
451. Id.
452. 528 S.W.3d 620 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2017, pet. denied).
453. Id. at 629.
454. Id.
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“Affidavit of Use and Possession” was meaningful.455 In the authors’
opinion, this case sends a lot of wrong messages, including discouraging
an attempt to settle a dispute and encouraging clogging the county
records with self-serving affidavits. Regardless, one should be careful
with couching how any offer to resolve an adverse possession dispute is
framed.
G. RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES
In ConocoPhillips Co. v. Koopmann,456 the Texas Supreme Court ad-
dressed the rule against perpetuities with respect to a reservation of a
future interest in a non-participatory royalty interest. In this case, the su-
preme court essentially found that although the rule against perpetuities
technically would invalidate the interest in question, the supreme court
did not invalidate the interest because it felt that such a holding would
not serve the purpose of the rule.457 The courts in Texas have long held
that the purpose of the rule against perpetuities is to prevent “landowners
from using remote contingencies to tie up land title and remove it from
commerce indefinitely.”458 With respect to oil and gas mineral interests,
restraint on alienability is not an issue. The holding, although significant,
is specifically limited to “future interests in the oil and gas context in
which the holder of the interest is ascertainable and the preceding estate
is certain to terminate.”459
VII. HOMESTEAD/HOME EQUITY LENDING
A. ABANDONMENT OF HOMESTEAD
Drake Interiors, Inc. v. Thomas460 involved the factual question of
whether a husband and wife abandoned their homestead at Asbury prior
to their final decree of divorce such that the creditor’s judgment (Drake
Interiors, Inc. (hereinafter Drake)), which was solely against the husband,
could attach to the Asbury home. Andrea and Rob Thomas lived at As-
bury together until February 2008, when they separated and Rob moved
out. On August 1, 2008, Andrea and Rob entered into a mediated settle-
ment agreement (MSA) pursuant to which Rob agreed that Andrea
should be awarded sole ownership of the Asbury home. Prior to this time
(in 2006), Andrea purchased a second home in her name only, demol-
ished the home, and built a new luxury custom home referred to as
Queenswood. Andrea and the couple’s children moved out of the Asbury
home in August 2008 and began living at Queenswood. On December 31,
2008, the divorce was finalized and became effective as of January 1,
455. Id. at 630.
456. 547 S.W.3d 858 (Tex. 2017).
457. Id. at 873.
458. Id.
459. Id.
460. 544 S.W.3d 449 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2018, no pet.).
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2009. Andrea switched her homestead to Queenswood effective January
1, 2009.
Andrea and Drake both moved for summary judgment, as to whether
Andrea and Rob abandoned the Asbury home prior to their divorce de-
cree on December 31, 2008. In order to show abandonment, the home-
stead claimant must stop using the property (i.e., discontinued use) and
form an intent to forsake the homestead (i.e., to never return). In this
case, both Rob and Andrea must have both (1) discontinued use; and (2)
had the intent to never return, for Rob and Andrea to be deemed as
having abandoned their homestead at Asbury.461 As to the first element,
the Fourteenth Houston Court of Appeals found that there was no genu-
ine issue of material fact as to whether there was discontinued use, as
both had stopped living in Asbury as of August 2008 (i.e., approximately
five months prior to the divorce decree).462
As to the second element of forsaking the homestead, the court found
that the intent element is difficult to show on summary judgment and that
both Andrea and Drake presented evidence of intent as part of their mo-
tions, including the MSA, in which Rob gave full ownership of Asbury to
Andrea and agreed to pay taxes and insurance on Queenswood until An-
drea remarried or the children reached the age of maturity.463 Rob’s
statements in the MSA could be forward looking. The court of appeals
found that when only part of the family relocates to a new home, evi-
dence of abandonment can be ambiguous.464 As a result, neither Andrea
nor Drake were entitled to summary judgment on the issue of
abandonment.465
In Alexander v. Wilmington Savings Fund Society,466 the Dallas Court
of Appeals construed language in the Texas constitution that when only
one spouse was the borrower but both spouses signed the security agree-
ment, the constitutional requirement that the lien be created with the
consent of both spouses was satisfied.467 The result complies with federal
law that only one spouse may be a borrower on a real estate loan and
fulfills the constitutional purposes for home equity loans.468
In Paull & Partners Investments, LLC v. Berry,469 the authors are re-
minded that a transfer of a homestead, signed by both spouses, can be
legitimate even if to a closely held entity. In this case, a transfer to an
entity was not a pretended sale, even though it was conducted in connec-
tion with a purchase money loan, largely because there was no condition
of defeasance once the loan was paid.470 The Fourteenth Houston Court
461. Id. at 457.
462. Id. at 456.
463. Id. at 457.
464. Id.
465. Id. at 456, 459.
466. 555 S.W.3d 297 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2018, no pet.).
467. Id. at 299–300.
468. Id. at 300.
469. 558 S.W.3d 802 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2018, no pet.).
470. Id. at 813–14.
372 SMU ANNUAL TEXAS SURVEY [Vol. 5
of Appeals found that the transfer was a legitimate intended sale and the
entity had the authority to transfer title to others.471
B. COMPLIANCE WITH HOME EQUITY LOAN FORMALITIES
1. Lender Cured Licensure Issue
In Worthing v. Deutsche Bank National Trust Co.,472 Howard and Lisa
Worthing refinanced their homestead in Marble Falls, Texas with a home
equity Note and Deed of Trust from Argent Mortgage Company, LLC
(Argent). In a complicated series of assignments, the original was ulti-
mately endorsed to Deutsche Bank and the Argent Note servicing was
assigned to Homeward Residential, Inc. (Homeward). The Worthings
stopped making payments after July 2009, and in July, 2012, the property
was sold at a foreclosure sale. The Worthings claimed, among other
things, that the foreclosure was wrongful and that there were violations of
Chapter 51 of the Texas Property Code, Chapter 392 of the Texas Finance
Code, and the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act. The trial court
granted summary judgement in favor of Deutsche Bank and the Worth-
ings appealed.
The court of appeals affirmed the trial court’s finding that, despite the
fact that Argent was not licensed to make a home equity loan in August
12, 2003, at the time the loan was entered into, Article XVI, Section
50(a)(6)(Q)(x) of the Texas constitution allowed for a lender to cure such
a deficiency.473 The language at issue was changed in September 13, 2003.
Because there was no statement of intent in the amendments for the re-
moval of the cure rights to apply retroactively, the court adhered to the
general rule that constitutional amendments and statutes operate pro-
spectively, absent an expressly provision otherwise. Because Argent had
cured its licensure issue relatively soon after the loan was made, the court
rejected the Worthings’ claim that Argent was an unauthorized lender.
The court of appeals also affirmed the trial court’s finding that the fact
that Deutsche Bank was in possession of a non-conforming promissory
note, which was different than the original note in that it was not en-
dorsed, did not create a fact issue over the ownership of the note.474 The
court reasoned that because there were multiple different holders and
servicers of the loan over a ten-year period, it was not entirely surprising
that a non-conforming copy of the note was in the file.475 This situation
471. Id. at 813.
472. 545 S.W.3d 127 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2017, no pet.).
473. Id. at 132 (citing TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 50(a)(6)(Q)(x)). At the time, this section
read, in relevant part, that “a lender shall “forfeit all principal and interest . . . if the lender
. . . fails to comply . . . within a reasonable time after the lender or holder is notified by the
borrower of the lender’s failure to comply.” Id. Argent became licensed as a Texas Mort-
gage Banker on December 17, 2003. On September 13, 2003, this language was substan-
tially changed to remove the cure language for an unlicensed lender. Id.
474. Id. at 137.
475. Id. at 136.
2019] Real Property 373
could simply have been the result of someone making a copy of the note
prior to it being endorsed.
2. Statute of Limitations not Applicable to Invalid Home Equity Loan
In Morris v. Deutsche Bank National Trust Company,476 Mattie T. and
Joseph K. Morris refinanced their homestead in 2004 with a home-equity
loan, and further refinanced the home-equity loan in January 2006 with
PHM Financial Incorporated. The PHM Financial loan was assigned mul-
tiple times and finally assigned to Deutsche Bank National Trust Com-
pany (the Bank) in December 2010. In 2012, after the Morrises stopped
making payments, the Bank conducted a non-judicial foreclosure sale.
There is no dispute that the loan was a home-equity loan or that the Deed
of Trust failed to include the requisite provisions for a valid home-equity
loan pursuant to Section 50(a)(6) of the Texas constitution.
Furthermore, Texas law is settled that a home-equity lien may be fore-
closed upon only by court order.477 The Morrises filed suit alleging,
among other things, wrongful foreclosure, that their homestead was pro-
tected from forced sale because the lien did not satisfy the requirements
of Section 50(a) of the Texas constitution, and slander of title/wrongful
eviction. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the Bank
on all of the foregoing causes of action, primarily on the basis that the
Morrises’ claims were barred by the four-year statute of limitations (i.e.,
the Morrises failed to bring suit within four years after executing the note
and deed of trust).
While this case was being appealed, the Texas Supreme Court decided
Wood v. HSBC Bank USA, N.A.,478 holding that liens securing constitu-
tionally noncompliant home-equity loans remain invalid until cured and
thus are not subject to any statute of limitations.479 The dispute in Wood
involved a quiet title action rather than wrongful foreclosure. However,
the court of appeals in Morris found Wood to be controlling because the
supreme court’s holding in Wood was grounded in the conclusion that a
lien that was invalid at origination remains invalid until cured, and did
not state that the holding was limited to quiet title actions.480 Accord-
ingly, to the extent that the trial court granted summary judgment on the
basis that the applicable claims brought by the Morrises were barred by
the statute of limitations, the court of appeals reversed the trial court’s
decision.481
476. 528 S.W.3d 187 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2017, no pet.).
477. Id. at 194.
478. 505 S.W.3d 542 (Tex. 2016).
479. Id. at 545.
480. Morris, 528 S.W.3d at 197.
481. Id.
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VIII. CONDOMINIUM/OWNER ASSOCIATIONS
A. DUTY TO MAINTAIN COMMON AREAS
The setting for Lakeside Village Homeowners Association v. Belan-
ger482 was the gated townhome community of Lakeside Village in which
Alfred “Corky” Belanger and Michael Drennon each owned townhomes
and each had issues with water leaks, flooding, tilting of the homes, rotat-
ing of the cripple wall, separating drywall, and other damage. Belanger’s
and Drennon’s townhomes shared an interior wall and a foundation wall,
and were thus a duplex. Railroad tie retaining walls were located on three
sides of the duplex property. The duplex was built with a cripple wall
down the middle, which was used to extend the top grade beam in order
to level the two units, so that it did not look like a split level dwelling
from the outside. A drainage pipe connected to the duplex carried water
from the retaining wall to the crawl space under the foundation of the
duplex.
The original lawsuit was filed in November 2001 against the Lakeside
Village Homeowner’s Association (Lakeside) and its management com-
pany, Principal Management Group, Inc. (Principal). A jury trial re-
turned verdicts in favor of plaintiffs Belanger and Drennon for damages
and attorneys’ fees. The claims on which plaintiffs prevailed were breach
of contract, Texas Water Code violations, trespass, and negligence claims.
The contracts between the owners and Lakeside consisted of: (1) the
Declaration of Covenants, Conditions & Restrictions (CC&Rs); (2) the
Articles of Incorporation; (3) the By-laws of the Lakeside Village associa-
tion; and (4) other miscellaneous agreements. The trial court found a duty
was owed by Lakeside and by Principal with respect to the maintenance,
repair, improvement, use, and construction (collectively, the Mainte-
nance) of the common areas in the community, and it was undisputed
that the retaining walls were part of the common areas.483 The jury found
that Lakeside and Drennan failed to maintain the retaining walls.484 The
El Paso Court of Appeals determined that there was sufficient evidence
to support a finding of failure of the retaining walls, citing that (1) there
were reserves available to pay for repairs; (2) expert testimony that the
foundation damage to the duplex resulted from the improperly built re-
taining wall that had no weep holes to allow water to seep out; and (3)
that lateral pressure on the foundation was the result of the ineffective
drainage.485 Ineffective drainage further caused the cripple wall to rotate,
resulting in additional structural and other damage.
A violation under Section 11.086(a) of the Texas Water Code is found
if a person diverts or impounds the natural flow of surface waters that
results damages to the property of another by the overflow of water di-
482. 545 S.W.3d 15 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2017, pet. denied).
483. Id. at 29.
484. Id.
485. Id. at 33.
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verted or impounded.486 To satisfy the causation element, the act or omis-
sion must be a “substantial factor” in causing the damage, without which
harm would not have occurred.487 Even though there was contradicting
evidence (the expert engineer for Lakeside and Principal claimed the
construction of the foundation was the cause of the damage), there was
enough evidence to support the jury’s conclusion that the diversion of
surface water resulting from the condition of the retaining wall was a sub-
stantial factor in the resulting damage.488
The trespass claim required the owners to establish three elements (1)
the plaintiff is lawfully in ownership or possession of real property; (2)
the defendant enters into the land and the entry was physical, intentional,
and voluntary; and (3) the trespass caused injury to plaintiff.489 The engi-
neer recommended that a pier-supported wall be installed and found evi-
dence that the retaining wall behind this duplex was in the worst
condition of any in the community.490 Lakeside engaged an engineer to
perform drainage work and repair retaining walls in 2011 for $49,455, but
the work ultimately was not performed by Lakeside, which decided the
bid was too expensive.491 This established the element of intent. In ad-
dressing a counter argument from appellants that a lower landowner has
a duty to receive the natural flow of surface water, the court of appeals
stated that flow of water must be unhindered by the hand of man for this
to apply, and the evidence supported a finding that the improper drain-
age of the retaining wall caused the resulting water damage.492
Establishing negligence required establishing a legal duty, breach, and
damages.493 Negligence was supported by the fact that (1) Lakeside and
Principal had duties to maintain common elements; (2) a 2005 study re-
vealed issues with the retaining walls; and, after receiving bids for
remediation, (3) Lakeside and Principal never acted on them and did not
repair the retaining walls until almost a decade later.494 Although the de-
fendants claimed faulty construction of the home, based on uncertified
plans that showed a different design for the duplex, the court of appeals
determined there was sufficient factual evidence to support a negligence
finding.495
B. ENFORCEMENT OF DEED RESTRICTIONS
Garden Oaks Maintenance Organization v. Chang496 involved the en-
forcement of a deed restriction. The subdivision was recorded together
486. Id. at 34 (citing TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 11.086(a)).
487. Id. at 35.
488. Id. at 35–36.
489. Id. at 36.
490. Id.
491. Id. at 27.
492. Id. at 37.
493. Id. at 38.
494. Id. at 39.
495. Id. at 39–40.
496. 542 S.W.3d 117 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2017, no pet.).
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with a deed restriction in 1939, limiting the construction on any lot to one
detached single-family dwelling with a one- or two-car garage. In 2010,
Garden Oaks Maintenance Organization (GOMO) filed a subdivision
management certificate. The Changs wanted to build a new home and
submitted plans for approval to GOMO that were rejected for having
more than a two-car garage. The plans were amended and were approved
by GOMO on the condition that the garage label be removed from the
attic space over the studio (based on the idea that the studio could be
converted to a garage). In fact, the Changs did convert the studio to a
garage after construction and removed a wall to install a garage door.
GOMO sought injunctive relief and civil penalties under Section
202.004(c) of the Texas Property Code based on violation of the deed
restriction.497 The Changs claimed that the deed restriction had been
abandoned and waived by GOMO and that GOMO’s exercise of author-
ity was unreasonable.498 The trial court ruled that GOMO had no author-
ity or standing to pursue any legal action against the Changs for
violations of the deed restriction.499 With respect to the authority of
GOMO to enforce the deed restriction, the Changs asserted that the doc-
uments establishing GOMO as a property owners association (POA)
under Section 201.005 and 204.006 of the Texas Property Code were inva-
lid and thus it could not enforce the deed restriction.500
In 2000, three owners filed a notice of formation of a POA, but did not
receive the requisite votes and it was dissolved. Another petition was
filed to form GOMO in July 2001, one year after the prior POA was dis-
solved. Section 201.006 of the Texas Property Code provides that another
POA cannot be formed within five years of the dissolution of the prior
POA.501 Section 204.005(f) provides, in relevant part, that if a petition is
not approved by the required percentage of owners within one year of
the creation of the petition, it is void and another committee may be
formed.502 The Fourteenth Houston Court of Appeals found the argu-
ment that the owners could circumvent the five-year waiting period un-
persuasive because the statute suggests a legislative intent to cause a long
waiting period after a POA is dissolved before a new committee can be
formed to alter the governance of the subdivision.503 Therefore, the POA
was not properly formed.504
In order for GOMO to have standing to sue, (1) its members must have
standing to sue in their own right; (2) the interests must be germane to
the organization’s purpose; and (3) the claim asserted or relief sought
must not require participation of the individual members.505 On this is-
497. Id. at 122.
498. Id. at 121.
499. Id. at 122.
500. Id. at 127.
501. Id. at 133.
502. Id. at 132 (citing TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 204.006(b)).
503. Id. at 134.
504. Id.
505. Id. at 137.
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sue, the court of appeals found that (1) the owners of the subdivision
have the right to prevent a breach; (2) GOMO is a neighborhood associa-
tion whose purpose is to maintain neighborhood integrity; and (3) the
relief sought would benefit the owners.506 Therefore, GOMO did have
standing to sue.507 Similarly, because GOMO, although not properly
formed, did have Bylaws giving it authority to sue, the trial court erred in
finding that there was no authority of GOMO to sue.508
C. RESTRICTIVE COVENANTS AND NEGATIVE EASEMENTS
1. Non-Access Easement is Valid and Enforceable
Teal Trading and Development, LP v. Champee Springs Ranches Prop-
erty Owners Association509 involved a declaration of CC&Rs that in-
cluded a non-access easement. The declaration essentially provided that
the declarant reserved, for the exclusive use of declarant and its succes-
sors and assigns, a one-foot easement for precluding and prohibiting ac-
cess to the property and other nearby roads by adjacent property owners.
It reserved one access entrance across the restrictive easement for the
Champee Ranches Subdivision, and no one else was to be granted access
without the consent of the declarant. After several transfers and a fore-
closure, Teal Trading acquired title to the 660-acre tract referred to as the
Privilege Creek Tract which was subject to the declaration. Teal Trading
also acquired the contiguous 1,173 acres that were not subject to the dec-
laration. However, the non-access easement effectively divided the 1,173
acres owned by Teal Trading from the Privilege Creek Tract it acquired.
The prior owner of the Privilege Creek Tract (Champee Springs) brought
suit to enforce the non-access easement and to prevent the development
of the road crossing the non-access easement.510
At trial, Champee Springs sought enforcement of the non-access ease-
ment by declaratory judgment. Teal Trading denied it was bound by the
restriction and sought a declaratory judgment that the non-access ease-
ment was an unreasonable restriction against alienation, and that
Champee Springs had waived its right to enforce the same.511
Texas has adopted the Restatement of Property as to what constitutes
an unreasonable restraint on alienation, which can be summarized as fol-
lows: (1) a disabling restraint (attempt by a conveyance to make a later
conveyance void); (2) a promissory restraint (attempt to cause a later
conveyance to impose contractual liability on a subsequent conveyance,
where liability results from breach of an agreement not to convey); and
(3) forfeiture restraint (attempt to terminate all or part of the interest in
property conveyed). There was no direct restraint on alienation by virtue
506. Id. at 138.
507. Id.
508. Id. at 140.
509. 534 S.W.3d 558 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2017, no pet.).
510. Id. at 569.
511. Id.
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of the non-access easement; the evidence presented at trial showed, at
best, an indirect restraint.512 An indirect restraint can only be stricken if it
bears some relationship to the evil which the rules prohibiting restraints
on alienation are designed to prevent. The Restatement of Property fur-
ther provides that indirect restraints are valid unless they lack a rational
justification, an issue on which Teal Trading failed to present any
evidence.513
Ultimately, the judgment that the non-access easement was valid and
enforceable was affirmed based on the fact that negative easements and
restrictive covenants are expressly recognized as valid by the Restate-
ment of Property.514
D. HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION’S AUTHORITY TO COMPEL
In C.A.U.S.E. v. Village Green Homeowners Association, Inc.,515 the
Village Green Homeowners Association (Association) sought to stream-
line trash delivery services to residents of the subdivision by entering into
a contract with Vaquero Waste & Recycling (Vaquero). This contract
made Vaquero the exclusive provider of waste collection services to the
community and required individual residents to pay for services directly
to Vaquero. Section 3.20 of the declaration governing the subdivision and
the Association provided that “[a]ll refuse garbage and trash shall be col-
lected or disposed of by Owner, at his expense.”516 The underlying issue
in this case was whether the Association was authorized to compel re-
sidents to use and pay for the services of a particular waste provider to
the exclusion of others. The Association argued that its powers under the
declaration to operate, maintain, and manage the common areas (includ-
ing streets) and, pursuant to its bylaws and articles, to generally maintain
the community cannot be read to render meaningless the more specific
language in section 3.20. The trial court granted the Association’s motion,
holding that the Association had the authority to compel owners or re-
sidents to use a particular provider. The San Antonio Court of Appeals
reversed on the grounds that the declaration was unambiguous and clear,
and the intent was for the individual owners (and not the Association) to
arrange for and pay the cost of trash collection.517
IX. CONSTRUCTION AND MECHANICS LIENS
A. RECOVERY OF ATTORNEYS’ FEES UNDER THE TCTFA
In Dudley Construction, Inc. v. ACT Pipe & Supply, Inc.,518 the Texas
Supreme Court decided the issue of whether a prevailing party in a claim
512. Id. at 575.
513. Id.
514. Id.
515. 531 S.W.3d 268 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2017, no pet.).
516. Id. at 270.
517. Id.
518. 545 S.W.3d 532 (Tex. 2018).
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under the Texas Construction Trust Fund Act (TCTFA) is entitled to at-
torney’s fees from the non-prevailing party. The supreme court held that
neither the TCTFA nor the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code Sec-
tion 38.001 expressly provide for the award of attorney’s fees to a prevail-
ing party for a successful TCTFA claim.519 Therefore, although Section
38.001 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code makes attorney’s
fees recoverable for a claim that could form the basis of a TCTFA claim,
because the TCTFA is a stand-alone statutory scheme, recovery of attor-
ney’s fees under this statute must be express for recovery to be
permitted.520
B. CONSTRUCTION DEFECTS
1. Mere “Puffing” not Basis for Fraud Claim
In Fitzgerald v. Water Rock Outdoors, LLC,521 Timothy and Wynne
Fitzgerald entered into a contract to purchase a newly constructed home
from Water Rock Outdoors, LLC d/b/a Artisan Homes (Artisan). The
Fitzgerald family moved into the home and notified Artisan of several
defects, some of which were repaired by Artisan. The Fitzgerald family
were not satisfied with the repairs but refused continued offers by Artisan
to repair the remaining defects.
The trial court granted partial summary judgment in favor of Artisan
on the Fitzgeralds’ common law claims of fraud, fraud in the inducement,
and unjust enrichment.522 Common law fraud requires a material misrep-
resentation which (1) was false; (2) was either known to be false when
made or was asserted without knowledge of whether it was true; (3) was
intended to be acted upon; (4) was relied upon; and (5) caused dam-
ages.523 Fraud in the inducement involves the same elements of fraud,
and also requires a contract as part of its proof and a promise of future
performance made with no intention of performing.524 Finally, unjust en-
richment is an implied-in-law contractual basis upon which an aggrieved
party may be awarded restitution when it would be an injustice to allow
the applicable benefits to be retained by the other party.525
The basis for the fraud claims were statements made by Artisan that it
was a high-quality custom homebuilder with years of experience, and that
Artisan was hard working, honest, and employs top-quality subcontrac-
tors. The Amarillo Court of Appeals found these statements to be mere
“puffing” and that the Fitzgerald family failed to raise a genuine issue as
to whether any such statements (if proven to be untrue) were material.526
While materiality is typically reserved to the trier of fact, if a statement is
519. Id. at 541.
520. Id. at 542.
521. 536 S.W.3d 112 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2017, pet. denied).




526. Id. at 118.
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obviously immaterial such that reasonable minds cannot differ, it is ap-
propriate for the court to find that the claim is not actionable as a matter
of law.527 Furthermore, unjust enrichment will generally not be a basis for
recovery where a valid, express contract covers the subject matter of the
parties’ dispute. The Fitzgerald family failed to explain how any of these
exceptions to this rule would apply in this case.528
C. LICENSED OR REGISTERED PROFESSIONALS—
CERTIFICATES OF MERIT
1. Court May Dismiss with Prejudice for Failure to File Certificate of
Merit
The primary issue in Pedernal Energy, LLC v. Bruington Engineering,
Ltd.529 was Section 150.002 of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code,
which requires a plaintiff to file an expert affidavit (i.e., a Certificate of
Merit) in a lawsuit or arbitration for damages arising out of the licensed
or registered professional services provision of the section. Pedernal sued
Bruington and others for damages with respect to a fracturing operation
on Pedernal’s gas well, alleging substandard engineering services, but
failed to file a Certificate of Merit. Section 150.003(e) of the Civil Practice
and Remedies Code provides that if the Certificate of Merit is not filed,
the trial court shall dismiss the claim and the dismissal may be with
prejudice.530
The case involved a nonsuit, a decision denying Bruington’s motion to
dismiss, and finally a motion to dismiss without prejudice at the trial court
level. The court of appeals first remanded the decision denying the mo-
tion to dismiss with instructions, and finally ruled on the second appeal
that the dismissal must be with prejudice. Because the plain language of
the statute indicates that the trial court may dismiss with prejudice, the
Texas Supreme Court found that the provision is discretionary and that
the court of appeals erred in ruling that the dismissal must be with
prejudice.531
2. Requirement for Certificate of Merit May be Waived
In Gosnell v. LaLonde,532 the Fort Worth Court of Appeals once again
addressed the Certificate of Merit statute. In the case at hand, the Gos-
nells filed suit in September 2011 for structural damage to their home
allegedly caused by the destabilization of the foundation after a chemical
was injected into the soil.533 After mediation and discovery, the engineers
527. Id. at 117.
528. Id. at 118–19.
529. 536 S.W.3d 487 (Tex. 2017).
530. Id. at 492 (citing TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 150.002(e) (emphasis
added)).
531. Id. at 497.
532. 559 S.W.3d 559 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2016, pet. granted) (mem. op.), aff’d sub
nom. LaLonde v. Gosnell, No. 16-0966, 2019 WL 2479172 (Tex. June 14, 2019).
533. Id. at 560.
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filed a motion to dismiss in January 2015 based on the failure of the
Gosenells to abide by the Certificate of Merit Statute when they filed
their initial suit.534 The trial court agreed and dismissed the case. The
court of appeals reversed. The Texas Supreme Court addressed this very
issue in Crosstex Energy Service, L.P. v. Pro Plus, Inc.,535 finding that
there was no one factor that would result in waiver and that courts must
look at the totality of the circumstances. However, the lower courts are
struggling to follow the guidance put forth by the supreme court that de-
fendant may be considered to have waived the right to dismissal for fail-
ure to file a certificate of merit when, under the totality of circumstances,
the defendant has substantially invoked the judicial process.536 In the
case at hand, the court of appeals found that the over three-year delay in
filing for dismissal, the participation in the discovery process, and at-
tempts to settle the case informally were all indications that “paint[ ] the
picture of defendants who did not intend to take advantage of their right
to dismissal.”537 The supreme court has granted the defendant’s petition
so we will have to see if the supreme court agrees with the court of ap-
peals interpretation of the Crosstex holding.
X. MISCELLANEOUS
A. PREMISES LIABILITY/NUISANCE
1. Actual Knowledge of Owner
In Cuevas v. Endeavor Energy Resources, L.P.,538 the Eastland Court
of Appeals relied on the Texas Supreme Court’s interpretation of Chap-
ter 95 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code and Ineos USA
LLC v. Elmgreen539 to find that the owner and operator of an oil and gas
well was not liable for the death of a contractor because the owner did
not have “actual knowledge” of the dangerous condition.540 Distinguish-
ing between actual knowledge and constructive knowledge, the court
stated that a requirement of actual knowledge is knowledge that “the
dangerous condition existed at the time of the accident.”541 Cuervas al-
leged common ownership between the owner and drilling contractor to
534. Id. at 561.
535. 430 S.W.3d 384 (Tex. 2014).
536. Id. at 393–94 (citing Murphy v. Gutierrez, 274 S.W.3d 627, 635 (Tex. App.—Fort
Worth 2012, pet. denied)).
537. Id. at 567.
538. 531 S.W.3d 375 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2017, pet. granted), rev’d sub nom. En-
deavor Energy Resources, LP v. Cuevas, No. 17-0925, 2019 WL 1966625 (Tex. May 3,
2019). It is a premises liability case addressing the actual knowledge requirement for liabil-
ity. Id.
539. 505 S.W.3d 555 (Tex. 2016).
540. Cuevas, 531 S.W.3d at 380–81. In relevant part, Chapter 95.003 provides: A prop-
erty owner is not liable . . . unless: . . . (2) the property owner had actual knowledge of the
danger or condition resulting in the personal injury, death, or property damage and failed
to adequately warn (emphasis added). TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 95.003.
541. Id. at 380 (citing Vanderbeek v. San Jacinto Methodist Hosp., 246 S.W.3d 346, 352
(Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2008, no pet.)).
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show actual knowledge of the contractor’s use of dangerous equipment
and procedure, but the court of appeals held such general knowledge did
not establish the required actual knowledge of the subject event.542 There
were no owner employees or agent present at the time of the injury or
who knew the repair work was being performed.543 The court of appeals
reiterated the Texas Supreme Court’s holding in Ineos which rejected the
premise that “general knowledge of a potentially dangerous condition
constituted actual knowledge of the dangerous condition that resulted in
the claimants’ injury.”544
2. Invitee Knowledge of Danger
Wallace v. ArcelorMittal Vinton, Inc.545 discussed whether an injured
party has a claim if the hazard is known to both the premises owner and
the injured party. In this particular case, Wallace was a night security
guard at a steel mill for over two years before the accident occurred. Wal-
lace was performing her nightly rounds of the machine shop when she
heard a noise in the driveway and tripped over an object that was lying
outside the machine shop. The record established that there were a vari-
ety of materials lying on the ground outside the machine shop waiting to
be utilized. Wallace claimed invitee status and that the metal object she
fell over was a dangerous condition that the mill owner should have
known of and failed to correct or warn. The trial court granted summary
judgment in favor of the mill owner on the grounds that Wallace knew of
the condition as it was a daily occurrence and, therefore, there was no
duty to warn. The El Paso Court of Appeals sustained. Texas law clearly
establishes a landowner’s duty to an invitee as being one, but not both, of
the following: (1) to “eliminate or mitigate the condition so that it is no
longer unreasonably dangerous”546; or (2) subject to two exceptions,547 to
“provid[e] an adequate warning of the danger to the invitee.”548 In this
case, the invitee was clearly aware of the danger so the owner had no
duty to make the premises safe or to warn.549 This is based on the legal
principle that the landowner is generally in a better position to know of
the danger but, if the invitee is aware of the danger, then the law will
assume that the invitee should take appropriate caution to protect
himself.550
542. Id. at 381.
543. Id. at 378.
544. Id. at 381.
545. 536 S.W.3d 19 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2016, pet. denied).
546. Id. at 23 (citing Gen. Elec. Co. v. Moritz, 357 S.W.3d 211, 216 (Tex. 2008); Shell Oil
Co. v. Khan, 138 S.W.3d 288, 295 (Tex. 2004)).
547. Id. There are two exceptions. The first is the criminal activity exception. Id. (citing
Timberwalk Apartments Partners, Inc. v. Cain, 972 S.W.2d 749 (Tex. 1998)); see also J.
Richard White et al., Real Property, 4 SMU ANN. TEX. SURV., 357, 414–16 (2018). The
second is the necessary-use exception. Wallace, 536 S.W.3d at 23 (citing Parker v. Highland
Park, Inc., 565 S.W.2d 512, 513–14 (Tex. 1978)).
548. Wallace, 536 S.W.3d at 23.
549. Id.
550. Id.
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3. Premises Liability vs. General Negligence
United Scaffolding, Inc. v. Levine551 was a premises liability case in
which the Texas Supreme Court distinguished pleadings based on general
negligence theory and premises liability theory. Levine, a pipefitter work-
ing at Valero Energy Corporation’s Port Arthur Refinery, fell through a
hole caused by unsecured planks in scaffolding erected by an indepen-
dent contractor, United Scaffolding, Inc. (USI). The basis for USI’s ap-
peal was that Levine submitted evidence for, and the court gave jury
charges based on, a general negligence theory, even though all of the evi-
dence presented related to a premises liability cases. The majority ruling
strenuously affirmed the supreme court’s prior holdings, including in
Clayton W. Williams, Jr., Inc. v. Olivo,552 which stated that “a premises
defect case improperly submitted to the jury under only a general negli-
gence question, without the elements of premises liability as instructions
or definitions, causes the rendition of an improper judgment.”553 This is
necessary, as the supreme court explains, because a general negligence
theory relates to “negligent activity encompass[ing] a malfeasance . . .
based on affirmative, contemporaneous conduct by the owner that caused
the injury,”554 whereas a premises liability theory “encompass[es] a non-
feasance theory based on the owner’s failure to take measures to make
the property safe.”555 Furthermore, for a premises liability case, the com-
plaining parties are required to additionally prove the elements discussed
in Corbin v. Safeway Stores, Inc.:556
(1) that [the defendant] had actual or constructive knowledge of the
condition on the premises; (2) that the condition posed an unreason-
ableness risk of harm . . . ; (3) that [premises owner] did not exercise
reasonable care to reduce or eliminate the risk; and (4) that [prem-
ises owner’s] failure to use such care proximately caused . . . personal
injuries.557
Levine’s injury was a typical slip and fall case, which historically had
been treated as a premises defect rather than an ordinary general negli-
gence case. The deciding issue here was whether the premises were under
the control of USI, as the owner of the scaffolding equipment, which as-
sembled, erected, and supervised the scaffolding, or Valero, which owned
the refinery premises and determined when scaffolding was to be used.558
The supreme court concluded that USI was in control of the scaffolding
based upon contractual obligations to erect, construct, and supervise the
scaffolding, as well as the various scaffolding policies enacted by Valero
551. 537 S.W.3d 463 (Tex. 2017).
552. 952 S.W.2d 523 (Tex. 1997).
553. Levine, 537 S.W.3d at 469–70.
554. Id. at 471 (citing Del Lago Partners, Inc. v. Smith, 307 S.W.3d 762, 776 (Tex.
2010)).
555. Id.
556. 648 S.W.2d 292, 296 (Tex. 1983).
557. Levine, 537 S.W.3d at 471.
558. Id. at 473.
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that required the contractor to insure the scaffolding was inspected
before each work shift, and that the contractor had sole authority to au-
thorize Valero employees’ use of the scaffolding, even though USI did
not have a Valero employee inspect the scaffolding on the day of its
use.559 The supreme court determined that such put USI in control of the
scaffolds.560 However, there was a three-justice dissenting opinion. The
continuing authority of the Levine majority must be understood in the
context of the current court makeup and that its opinion may change with
subsequent changes in the court.
4. Off-Property Injury
Nichols v. McKinney561 involved a negligence claim brought because
wild bees located in the adjacent property owner’s garage caused death to
the neighboring property owner. Melody Nichols was the owner of prop-
erty adjoining McKinney’s property, where bees had infiltrated into his
garage wall. Nichols was attacked by a swarm of bees from this hive when
she stopped her lawnmower between her house and McKinney’s garage.
Although Nichols ran into her home, she fell unconscious and medical
personnel could only revive her on life support. She ultimately died after
three months on life support. The heirs of Nichols sued McKinney for
various causes of negligence. McKinney asserted as his defense the doc-
trine of ferai naturai, precluding any duty to Nichols. The Waco Court of
Appeals noted Texas law was well established that a landowner is not
liable for actions of indigenous wild animals except in certain specified
instances.562 Further, the court noted that the doctrine of ferai naturai
could be used as a defense to negate premises liability claims.563 But the
court deemed it was a matter of first impression in Texas as to whether to
apply the ferai naturai doctrine as a defense “in a general negligence case
where the act occurred somewhere other than on the defendant’s prop-
erty.”564 The initial threshold question in a common law negligence case
is whether a duty is owed. Factors such as risk, foreseeability, and likeli-
hood of injury, compared to the social utility of the conduct, the magni-
tude of burden against injury, and the consequences of assessing such
burden, are to be considered.565 In addressing these factors, the court
stated that, while foreseeability of bee stings is an appropriate factor, the
magnitude of the duty on property owners to control indigenous wild ani-
mals would be too substantial a burden.566 Consequently, the court held
there was no such duty of a landowner to protect adjoining landowners
from the activities of indigenous wild animals originating on the owner’s
559. Id. at 475–76.
560. Id. at 478–79.
561. 553 S.W.3d 523 (Tex. App.—Waco 2018, pet. denied).
562. Id. at 528.
563. Id.
564. Id.
565. Id. (citing Greater Hous. Transp. Co. v. Phillips, 801 S.W.2d 523, 525 (Tex. 1990)).
566. Id. at 529.
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property.567
The Nichols heirs also alleged negligent undertaking because McKin-
ney had attempted to eliminate the bees but was unsuccessful. In defense,
McKinney alleged only the lack of duty, which the court held did not
negate the duty element for negligence undertaking claims.568 There are
three types of nuisance causes of action: negligently-caused nuisance, in-
tentional nuisance, and strict liability nuisance.569 In the negligence nui-
sance claim, McKinney’s “no duty” defense would have been sufficient to
negate such a cause of action.570 However, the proof of common law duty
is not applicable to intentional nuisance and strict liability nuisance
claims.571 The appropriate inquiry in intentional nuisance is directed to
the actual intent to cause the interference and not in the intent to engage
in conduct which results in the interference.572
In the strict liability nuisance claim, there must be a showing that liabil-
ity arose out of “abnormally dangerous activity” or “abnormally danger-
ous substance” which involves a “high degree of risk.”573 Because
McKinney failed to negate any elements of such intentional nuisance or
strict liability nuisance claims, summary judgment in his favor was not
appropriate.574 Finally, the Nichols heirs alleged negligence per se based
on a City of Midlothian ordinance regarding breeding places for bees.575
McKinney introduced testimony of a city code enforcement official, not-
ing that the breach of the statute only occurs after notice of the condition
and failure to correct the condition, rather than just the existence of the
condition (breeding place for bees).576 Consequently, the heirs were una-
ble to prove a negligence per se claim based upon violation of the
ordinance.577
5. Improvements
Rawson v. Oxea Corp.578 was a premises liability case arising from inju-
ries sustained from an electrical backfeed problem at Oxea’s power sub-
station. The injuries arose from an electrical power shortage in a
transformer at the electrical substation owned by Oxea. Oxea’s employee
called a subcontractor to replace the damaged insulator (separating the
bare electrical wire from a steel beam). Oxea’s employee attempted to
567. Id.
568. Id. at 530 (noting that “‘nuisance’ refers not to a defendant’s conduct or to a legal
claim or cause of action but to a type of legal injury involving interference with the use or
enjoyment of real property”) (citing Crosstex N. Tex. Pipeline L.P. v. Gardiner, 505 S.W.3d





573. Id. at 531.
574. Id.
575. Id.
576. Id. at 532.
577. Id.
578. 557 S.W.3d 17 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2016, pet. dism’d).
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shut down power to this section of the electrical substation to allow Raw-
son to work in safety. However, Oxea’s employee failed to turn off two
“top pole switches,” and there was a “backfeed” or “backflow” of elec-
tricity into the section of the electrical substation where Rawson was
working, causing injury. The trial court awarded summary judgment to
Oxea, which Rawson appealed. Oxea asserted a defense under the owner
premises liability statute.579 The exclusionary provision of the premises
liability statute provides a defense for liability for “injury, death, or prop-
erty damage to a contractor, subcontractor or employee of a contractor or
subcontractor who constructs, repairs, renovates or modifies an improve-
ment to real property . . . unless (1) the property owner exercises or re-
tains some control . . . and (2) the property owner had actual knowledge
of the danger or condition . . . .”580
Rawson alleged that Oxea did not meet its burden to prove the “condi-
tion” or “use” requirements under the statute. But the First Houston
Court of Appeals, relying upon a prior Texas Supreme Court decision581
stating that “all negligence claims that arise from either a premises defect
(a ‘condition’) or a property owner’s negligent activity (a ‘use’)”582 met
this burden, concluded that the premises liability statute was applica-
ble.583 The electrical substation was across the street from a chemical
plant owned by Oxea, which is the location of the top pole switches that
were not appropriately switched off in order to prevent the backfeed
electrical shock. Therefore, Rawson alleged that his injury occurred at the
substation while the defective condition or negligence occurred across the
street at the plant where the top poles’ switches were located.584
The court of appeals rejected this argument, relying on Ineos.585 The
broad definition of the term “improvement” in the statute requires that
the insulator on which Rawson was working was part of the substation
which constituted the “improvement” for purposes of the statute.586 This
squares with the supreme court’s decision in Ineos, where damages oc-
curred from a furnace explosion, which rejected the notion that the fur-
nace should be considered the improvement, rather than the entire plant
consisting of three furnaces and other system improvements.587
Additionally, Rawson attempted to avoid application of the premises
liability statute by suggesting that he was at the premises to replace the
insulators, not to repair them. However, the court viewed his work as
being a repair of the entire electrical substation of which the insulator
579. Id. at 25.
580. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 95.003.
581. Abutahoun v. Dowell Chemical Co., 463 S.W.3d 42 (Tex. 2015).
582. Rawson, 557 S.W.3d at 25.
583. Id. at 27.
584. Id.
585. Id. at 27–28; see also Ineos U.S. LLC v. Elmgreen, 505 S.W.3d 555 (Tex. 2016); see
also J. Richard White et al., Real Property, 4 SMU ANN. TEX. SURV. 357, 412–13 (2018)
(discussing Ineos).
586. Rawson, 557 S.W.3d at 28.
587. Id.
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was a component part.588 Finally, Rawson attempted to prove that Oxea
had actual knowledge of the condition, which would have avoided prem-
ises liability protection. In this respect, the court found the knowledge
requirement meant actual knowledge and not any constructive or im-
puted knowledge.589 There was sufficient evidence at trial from the depo-
sition and testimony to prove that Oxea did not have actual knowledge of
the top pole switches being incorrectly set. Therefore, Rawson did not
satisfy the legal requirement of actual knowledge as opposed to what a
reasonable person could have or should have known as it relates to the
dangerous condition.590
B. AD VALOREM TAXES
1. Appeal—Appraisal Value v. Denial of Exemption
Vitol Inc. v. Harris County Appraisal District591 involved a failure to
timely file an appraised value protest. Vitol received a notice of valuation
of his petroleum storage inventory, which did not include an exemption
for interstate commerce as allowed under the statute. Rather than filing a
timely protest, Vitol had conversations and correspondence with the ap-
praisal district to no avail. Vitol filed a late protest with the appraisal
review board, which denied the protest as being untimely filed. Vitol ap-
pealed. The appraisal district filed a plea to the jurisdiction that the trial
court granted. Vitol received notice that the appraised value notice pursu-
ant to Chapter 25 of the Texas Tax Code, which has specific protest re-
quirements, failed the requirements, depriving the court of jurisdiction.
However, Vitol claimed the protest deadline should be determined by the
date of his receipt of a letter denying a specific exemption under Chapter
11 of the Texas Tax Code.
The Fourteenth Houston Court of Appeals held that the “failure to file
a timely protest for an exemption based on interstate commerce is not a
procedural error but is a jurisdictional one because it implicates exhaus-
tion of remedies.”592 The notice of the appraised value, which contained a
reference to zero dollars was sufficient notice as to the denial of the ex-
emption to start the timeframe for the protest. The court specifically held
that the “failure to timely pursue and exhaust the administrative reme-
dies available to it under the Texas Tax Code to protest the [appraisal
valuation] Notice is not excused by any alleged failure by [the appraisal
district] to provide or timely deliver any requisite [exemption denied] no-
588. Id. at 28–29. The supreme court also relied upon Montoya v. Nichirin-Flex. U.S.A.,
Inc., 417 S.W.3d 507, 512 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2013, no pet.), which acknowledged the lack
of a statutory definition for “repairs,” but nevertheless, defined it to mean “to restore to a
good or sound condition after decay or damage; . . . to restore or renew by any process of
making good, strengthening, etc. . . .”
589. Id. at 30.
590. Id. at 32–33.
591. 529 S.W.3d 159 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2017, no pet.).
592. Id. at 167.
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tice under Chapter 11.”593
2. Commerce Clause—Interstate Commerce Exemption
ETC Marketing. v. Harris County Appraisal District594 was another
case dealing with ad valorem taxes for storage of natural gas in the state
of Texas and taxes under the Texas Tax Code. The question presented
was whether the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution,
which limits a state’s power to tax interstate commerce, prohibits the
state of Texas from taxing natural gas stored in Texas while awaiting fu-
ture resale in the course of interstate commerce. ETC Marketing bought
natural gas at the Katy Marketing Hub and transported it via Houston
Pipe Line Company (HPL) pipes, storing it in an underground storage
facility known as the Bammel Facility in Harris County. Gas is accumu-
lated during the summer months when demand is low and is sold into
interstate commerce during the winter months when gas demand is
higher. Harris County taxed ETC’s gas at the Bammel Facility as personal
property not in interstate commerce. ETC claimed the gas was within the
stream of interstate commerce and should be exempt from taxation.
The appraisal review board denied ETC’s challenge. Texas Tax Code
Section 11.01(c)(1) allowed taxation of personal property located in the
state longer than a “temporary period,” and Texas Tax Code Section
21.02(a)(1), known as the taxable situs requirement, prohibits taxation
where the personal property is located within the taxing jurisdiction for
only a temporary period.595 The Texas Supreme Court, recognizing the
principle of constitutional avoidance, considered the Texas statutory
scheme prior to addressing the Commerce Clause challenged under the
Unites States Constitution. The supreme court determined that ETC
failed to plead under the Texas Tax Code, arguing only with respect to the
Commerce Clause.596 Therefore, ETC waived its right on appeal to raise
issues concerning this Texas Tax Code.597
In addressing the Commerce Clause (or rather the dormant Commerce
Clause) as discussed in Oklahoma Tax Commission v. Jefferson Lines,
Inc.,598 the supreme court noted that the current test as announced in
Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady599 is a four prong test: (1) substan-
tial nexus; (2) fairly apportioned; (3) non-discrimination against interstate
commerce; and (4) fairly related.600 The supreme court further indicated
that it thought the prior U.S. Supreme Court “in transit test,” established
in Minnesota v. Blasius,601 might still be applicable having not been ex-
593. Id. at 170–71.
594. 528 S.W.3d 70 (Tex. 2017), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 557 (Dec. 2017) (mem.).
595. Id. at 74.
596. Id. at 75.
597. Id.
598. 514 U.S. 175 (1995).
599. 430 U.S. 274 (1977).
600. ETC Marketing, 528 S.W.3d at 76.
601. 290 U.S. 1 (1933).
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pressly negated by Complete Auto.602
Prior to reaching the Complete Auto test, the supreme court first had to
determine whether the gas was in interstate commerce. The supreme
court concluded that the gas entered interstate commerce because when
the gas enters the HLP system, the gas connects to an interstate pipe line
network.603 Under the Complete Auto test, the supreme court determined
that there was a substantial nexus based on the relationship of the subject
property (gas) and the state.604 The supreme court expressed its disap-
proval of a prior decision which focused on the physical presence in the
state of the taxpayer, taxpayer’s office, employees, representatives, or
physical facilities.605
Secondly, the fair apportionment element of the Complete Auto test
was satisfied if the tax was internally consistent, meaning that if every
state were to impose an identical tax, there would not be multiple taxa-
tion. This was satisfied here because the Texas Tax Code had a specific
date of the year for the property tax that made it clearly in compliance.606
The interstate commerce discrimination element was also satisfied be-
cause there was no different treatment by the taxing authority of intra-
state as compared to interstate gas.607 Finally, the reasonable relationship
test was considered applicable based on the relationship of the gas to the
state tax. Rejecting ETC’s contention that its extra gas at the Bammel
Facility created no new state burdens, and rejecting ETC’s argument that
the entrustment of the gas pursuant to a storage agreement with HPL,
should have relieved ETC of any tax burden.608
This opinion was subject to one concurrence, which accepted the result
but complained of the court’s continued judicial activism by creating the
“dormant Commerce Clause,”609 and one dissent by Chief Justice Hecht,
who believed that the gas was in interstate commerce even with its in-
terim storage.610 Writ of certrorari to the United States Supreme court
was denied, so this is the current Texas law on this issue.
XI. CONCLUSION
Attacks on due process under the Texas forcible detainer in a post-
foreclosure tenancy-at-sufferance scenario continued this Survey period,
but Reynoso reiterated the U.S. Constitutional due process protection
limitation requiring state action and not contractual provisions between
parties.
602. ETC Marketing, 528 S.W.3d at 76.
603. Id. at 78.
604. Id. at 72.
605. Id.; see also Peoples Gas, Light, and Coke Co. v. Harrison Cent. Appraisal Dist.,
270 S.W.3d 208 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2008, pet. denied).
606. Id. at 86.
607. Id. at 87.
608. Id. at 88–89.
609. Id. at 90–91.
610. Id. at 93.
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Refinements in the jurisprudence on derivative actions in closely held
limited liability companies was addressed in Lone Star, requiring mem-
bership at the time of the suit. And in relief to all nature-loving property
owners, wild bees living in the owner’s property and attacking a person
“off-premises” will not cause liability under the premises liability statute
according to Nichols.
The Texas Supreme Court has accepted petition in a tenancy-at-suffer-
ance case with issues on the justice court jurisdiction; so, perhaps the su-
preme court will attempt to bring further clarity to these issues. The
Godoy case petition has been accepted, so the Moayedi waiver expansion
for statute of limitations waiver will get a final analysis. Petition from
Armour Pipe Line has been filed, with the possibility that the Texas Su-
preme Court may reconsider whether domestic and foreign entities
should be treated differently under forfeiture to do business statutes.
As can be seen, the courts continue to use a reasonable language ap-
proach within deeds and documents to discern the intent of the parties.
Moreover, the courts seem very willing to use legislative intent and pur-
pose to construe statutes and the Texas constitution, such as when dealing
with homestead, to reach a reasonable result. Only in the areas of restric-
tions and ad valorem taxation were the courts found to strictly apply pro-
cedural and statutory requirements.
